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ABSTRACT
The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers is authorized to
permit or deny dredge and fill activities in the nation's
coastal and wetland regions. Originally, responsible only
for the maintenance of navigation, the Corps considered
only navigational requirements in decisions to grant or
deny permits. Now, however, the Corps must demonstrate
,
that the "public interest" is served as well. This study
examines the scope of the pUblic interest and attempts to
evaluate the effectiveness of the program in a particularly
controversial project. The initial phase provides evaluation
criteria necessary to analyze the application of the pUblic
interest review. The second phase determines the effective-
ness of the review in the Hampton Ro~ds refinery proposal.
The results of this analysis suggest that the Corps complied
with all procedural requirements within the broad pUblic
interest mandate. Factors, however, many of which are
outside of the Corps' jurisdiction, exist which impact
the decision making process.
ii
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CHAPTER I.
INTRODUCTION
Overview of Army Corps of Engineers
Public Interest Review Program
Historically, the Army Corps of Engineers has had
a major role in the regulation of coastal activities. Its
role was originally limited to maintaining navigable waters
unobstructed for the free flow of commerce. Increasing
public concern expressed over the destruction of coastal
natural resources encouraged the legislative and judicial
branches of the Federal government to expand the Corps'
role to include consideration of factors far removed from
the navigational mandate. Such factors include the effects
a proposed project would have on wetlands, fish and wi1d-
life values, water quality, recreation, and the public
interest (emphasis added).l
The! public interest review has become a particularly
important component in determining whether or not to grant
permits fol:' coastal alteration activit.ies. Before the
Corps can qrant a permit, it must determine that the proposed
activity is in the best public interest. However, there
is no clear concensus on a definition for public interest.
Consequently, public interest decision making can become
quite difficult.
1
2The Corps' regulations do not attempt to define
the public interest. Instead, they list factors from the
categories of economic development, energy needs, environ-
mental protection and the general public welfare which
constitute the pUblic interest. The Corps is then required
to carefully weigh all factors relevant to each particular
case. As a result, the Corps must receive on a case by
case basis, all proposals for waterfront development; to
evaluate the economic, environmental and social consequences
of each; and then to permit, deny or modify the proposal
based on the public interest review. 2 During this individual
review process, the Corps is supposed to balance the bene-
fits which may accrue from the proposal with the potential
detriments. The decision to authorize a permit is there-
fore part of this general balancing process. 3 Such evalua-
tion procedures have transformed the role of the Corps from
a navigational mission oriented agency into a public interest
advocate. Or as Senator Muskie observed: "We have put the
fox in the chicken coop and it has become a chicken.,,4
The following study will attempt to determine the
effectiveness of the Corps public interest review program.
To achieve this goal, first, the intent and scope of the
interest review will be revealed through a historical
analysis of legislative and judicial events. Second, the
Hampton Roads refinery proposal will serve as a case study
to examine the Corps decision making process as related to
3the implementation of the public interest provision. Third,
the Hampton Roads decision will be evaluated in light of the
public interest objectives. Furthermore, it is hoped that
the problems identified and suggestions offered can be used
to improve the pUblic interest review process.
Overview of the Hampton Roads Refinery Project
The Hampton Roads Energy Company (HREC) in March,
1975 applied to the Army Corps of Engineers for permits to
construct a refinery and marine terminal in Portsmouth,
Virginia along the west bank of the Elizabeth River. The
refinery, initially designed to process 175,000 barrels of
Middle Eastern crude oil per day would eventually be ex-
panded to process 250,000 barrels of crude per day into low
5
sulfur petroleum products.
The refinery would be equipped with an oil spill
containment system and a wastewater treatment system which
would remove much of the oil products and chemicals before
direct discharge into the Elizabeth River, a tributary of
the Chesapeake Bay.6 See figures 1 and 2 for illustrations
of the Bay and refinery location.
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Fig. 2. Proposed Refinery Location
SOURCE: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Final
Environmental Impact Statement: Hampton Roads Energy
Company's Portsmouth Refinery and Terminal, Portsmouth,
Virginia, August 1977, p.A-19
6The lower Bay, near the Hampton Roads Harbor is the site
of many commercially important fisheries and recreational
opportunities. See Figure 3 for locations of these fishery
resources.
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Fig. 3. Lower Chesapeake Bay Yishery Resourcea
SOURCE: U.S. Coast Guard, Local Oil Contingency Plan for MSO Hampton
Roads, (Norfolk, Virginia), 1 March 1979.
8This portion of the Bay is becoming increasingly stressed
from a wide variety of organic and inorganic pollutants.
Many fear that a new refinery will increase the oil spill
probability to unacceptable levels and could herald the long-
term demise of the $78 million oyster and blue crab fisheries.
The qualitative permitting process had persistent
problems at every level. The Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA), National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Adminis-
tration (NOAA) and the Department of Interior (DOl) recommended
denial of the permits while the Departments of Defense,
. 7Treasury and Energy (DOE) consistently supported the proJect.
At the local level, the City of Portsmouth along with business
and industrial organizations have enthusiastically encouraged
the refinery complex. Organized opposition has come from
CARE (Citizens Against the Refinery's Effects) along with
special interest groups. Objection to the refinery has
predominantly been linked to potential impacts on marine
resources, air quality and economic dislocation of Bay
dependent industries.
In October of 1979, Clifford Alexander, Secretary of
the Army, granted the construction permits necessary for
HREC to proceed with the project. The decision, which cul-
minated after four years of controversy, rested on what the
Secretary deemed to be the best public interest. In reach-
ing his decision, the Secretary had to balance two very
critical pUblic interest review factors, the national need
9for energy -- specifically refined petroleum products, and
the value of the unique resources of the Chesapeake eco-
system.
CHAPTER II
METHODS
This study is divided into three sections. The
first section addresses the scope and intent of the public
interest review. The second section examines how the
public interest review was implemented in the decision
making process for the Hampton Roads refinery. The final
section evaluates the adequacy with which the Corps imple-
mented the public interest review in the case example. The
spe~ific method of program evaluation utilized in this study
8
was developed by Englander, Feldman, and Hershman and is
referred to as organizational process ev~luation.
Organizational process evaluation provides informa-
tion about organizational capacity by examining the decision
making procedures of a regulatory agency. The objective of
process evaluation is to identify the adequacy with which
the regulatory agency implements its program and to identify
process problems which limit its effectiveness.
In the present study, process evaluation was per-
formed in the following manner:
1. The objectives of the Corps public interest review
were addressed through a historical analysis of:
a. applicable legislation and the corresponding
legislative history;
10
2.
3.
11
b. judicial interpretation;
c. program objectives expressed in current regulation.
Brief examples were discussed to determine in actuality
how the public review criteria ware implemented. Infor-
mation was gathered from:
a. law review journal arti~les;
b. interagency correspondence;
c. interviews with Corps personnel.
The Hampton Roads refinery example was analyzed to
determine how the public interest was implemented in
the decision making process. First, the public interest
review factors specific to Hampton Roads were examined.
Then the role of these factors in the decision making
process was scrutinized. Information for both steps
was found in:
a. the environmental impact statement and consultant
reports;
b. interagency correspondence;
c. Corps decision making papers;
d. interviews with involved Federal and State agencies.
4. The findings were evaluated in light of the expressed
pUblic interest goals to determine if the objectives
were achieved.
5. Based on the results of the preceding sections,
suggestions to improve the process were made.
One disclaimer should be noted. As previously
mentioned, process evaluation involves analysis of a
12
decision making process. Unfortunately, the criteria for
such an evaluation tend to be difficult to ascertain.
Public interest objectives, as expressed in regulation are
exceedingly broad and frequently conflicting. Also, much
of the information used by regulatory agencies is qualitative
thereby making evaluation subjective. Moreove~ procedures
for implementation of the review factors appear to be ad hoc.
Consequently, process evaluation is not a precise procedure
and is not used in this study as such.
CHAPTER III
CORPS ACTIVITY IN THE COASTAL ZONE
Historical Evaluation
The concept of the public interest review was born
from extensive legislative and juqicial ~eview. Accord-
ingly, understanding of the need and purposes of the public
interest review cannot be presented without examining the
history of the Corps' activity in the coastal zone and the
evolution of this activity through the years. This section
documents the role the Corps plays in coastal development
and determines the historical factors which provided impetus
for enlargement of its duties. This examination will reveal
the scope and intent of the public interest review.
Rivers and Harbors Act
Congress created the Army Corps of Engineers in
1802. Until 1812 it was responsible for frontier defense
construction. 9 Beginning with the War of 1812, its authority
was expanded to inspection of coastal fortifications at
important east coast ports and harbors. Throughout the
nineteenth century, Congress continued to authorize the
Corps to make improvements in rivers and harbors1but the
purpose of such improvements changed from fortification to
the promotion of navigation. These projects included
deepening of channels and restoration of harbors. After
13
14
the Civil War, Congress began to annually appropriate funds
for the improvement of rivers and harbors. l O
In 1877, the Chief of the Engineers initiated a
proposal which would ensure that harbor areas were protected
from congestion caused by random development of wharves and
piers. The legislation, known as the "Dolph Bill", met
little success in Congress until an important Supreme Court
ruling rekindled interest. In 1888, the u.S. Supreme Court
held, in Williamette Iron Bridge Co. v. Hatch that in the
absence of a statutory enactment by Congress, state legis-
latures could authorize or prohibit the construction of
bridges, dams, etC. in or over waters within the state
. dl f h h h b t d . t' 11regar ess 0 w et er suc structures 0 struc e nav~ga ~on.
The implication of such a ruling was far reaching. Without
federal legislation stating otherwise, the maintenance of
free, unobstructed navigation would be left to the individual
states. States could authorize projects which would hinder
. 12 13the flow of commerce through nav~gable waters. '
In response to the Supreme Court ruling, Congress
passed the Dolph Bill in 1890. The new legislation, known
as the Rivers and Harbors Act, not only required the approval
of the Secretary of War for construction of all bridges in
navigable waters, but for all construction activities in
navigable waters (emphasis added). The Act also forbade
the deposition of refuse into navigable waters without the
14permission of the Secretary of War.
15
In 1896, at the request of Congress, the Chief of
the Corps of Engineers compiled all general laws relating
to navigational waters and proposed revisions and enlarge-
ments advantageous to the public interest. The changes were
incorporated in a draft bill which became the River and Harbors
Act of 1899 (RRA).15 It is interesting to note that this is
the first time the term "public interest" is mentioned in
any act dealing with water resources.
Three sections of the 1899 Act remain in effect
today; two of which eventually helped to shape the present
public interest review. These sections will be discussed in
their modern context later, but for now it is sufficient to
state the purposes of both. Section 10 prohibits obstruction
or alteration of any navigable waters unless recommended by
the Chief of the Engineers. 1 6 Sec~ion 13, better known as
the Refuse Act, made it illegal to discharge refuse into
navigable waters or to place it in areas where it could
easily wash into such waters. Sewage, however, was excluded
f S . 13 . . 17rom ect10n requ1rements.
Although court rulings eventually expanded the juris-
dictional requirements of the RHA considerably, the Corps
initially accepted a limited interpretation of the Act.
First, the Corps concluded that its role was restricted to
harbors only and accordingly, excluded all activities out-
side of well defined harbor regions from section 10 permit
requirements. Second, the Corps drew lines within harbor
16
areas where landfills or construction activities were per-
mitted without section 10 authorization. Section 13 was
rarely used and only then to impose civil or criminal
responsibility on those who discharged waste matter that
directly impeded navigation.
Initially, the courts upheld the Corps' narrow
interpretation of its responsibility. As late as 1936, in
Miami Beach Jockey Club v. oern,18 the court held that the
applicant for a permit under section 10 was entitled to a
decision based "exclusively on evidence determining whether
or not the project would obstruct the navigational capacity
of the waterway and hence hinder commerce.,,19
Shortly after this decision, however, the courts
began to interpret wider meaning into the RHA~ In U.S. v.
I h · I' 20 h d I' dAppa ac 1an E ectr1c Power Co. t e respon ent c a1me
that its proposed hydroelectric project was e~empt from
regulatory jurisdiction of the RHA because th~ project
would be located in non-navigable waters. The power company
used physical stream characteristics such as water depth as
evidence of non-navigability. The Supreme Court, however,
held that federal power over navigable waters was not
limited to control for the purposes of navigation only, but
was as broad as the needs of commerce. Water power develop-
ment from dams was, from the pUblic's standpoint, a by
product of the general use of the rivers, for commerce.
Furthermore, the court concluded that flood protection,
watershed development, as well as hydroelectric power and
0,-",
p.
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other concerns in u.s. waters were within the proper scope
of the commerce power. 2l
The Appalachian Power case significantly redefined
navigability to include all waters, regardless of their
physical characteristics, so long as development in the
water body ~as within the scope of the commerce power.
While this case dramatically increased the Corps' physical
jurisdiction, U.S. v. Republic Steel22 expanded the concept
of obstruction in navigable waters thereby expanding the
breadth of the RHA permit requirements. In the latter case,
the court held that industrial pollution discharged through
the sewers was rightfully classified as refuse and, there-
fore, violated section 13 of the RHA.
Republic Steel pumped ° water for industrial use and
returned it to the river through the sewer systems. The
waste water was heavily laden with particulate ~atter which
floculated in.to larger units and sank to the bottom of the
river. In time, the depth of the channel was reduced by
several feet.. The Court he Ld that the industrial solids
created an obstruction to 'the navigable capacity and its
discharge was, therefore, a violation of section 10 of the
RHA. 23
The court's decision was based on an interpretation
of the seemingly antiquated 1899 Act. The Act specifically
excluded sewage from the Corps' regulatory jurisdiction.
The Court, however, held that use of sewers to discharge
¥.:
18
wastes other than sewage violated the section 13 prohibition
against refuse. The court focused on the type of discharge
rather than the manner of disposal.
These two cases, ~achian Power and Republic Steel
demonstrate the courts' ability to expand and interpret
jurisdiction under the RHA and exemplify the capacity of the
legal and political processes to respond to changing needs.
Together, they demonstrate that the federal constitutional
system permits the enlargement of federal power to fill voids
even without Congressional action. The judiciary and adminis··
trative agencies are able to achieve this expansion of power
through the elaboration and interpretation of ambiguous
terms of statutes. In addition to proving that old laws
can be interpreted to meet new problems, these cases initiated
the era of public interest where future legislative and
judicial review continued to increase thE! Corps' responsi-
bility.
Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act, 1958 Amendments 24
The Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act, as amended,
provides that fish and wildlife conservation will receive
equal consideration with other feat~res of water resource
development programs. The amendments were necessary to
remedy the earlier Act's failure to achieve this goal and
to address problems posed by a rapidly expanding society.
Unlike the amendments, the original Act did not pertain to
dredge and fill projects by private interests or other
19
non federal entities in navigable waters. This caused
particular concern among commercial fishermen who were well
aware of tha negative impacts dredge and fill operations
have on many important species.
The amendec Act affects the Corps' dredge and fill
permit responsibilities. Section 2(a) requires the Cor?s
to consult with the U. S. Fish and Wildlife serv.tce (FWS)
before undertaking projects which entail deepening, impound-
ments, diversions, or any modification of a stream or other
body of water.
During consultation, FWS recommends practices which
will mitigate fish and wildlife damage during the construc-
tion and operation stages of the projects. 25 The Corps is
obligated to give full consideration to the FWS recommellda-
tions. Hence, for the first time, the Corps is required to
consider additional values besides those embodied in its
original navigation mandate when granting p~rmits for coastal
projects.
Memorandum of Understanding, 1967
The FWCA did not satisfactorily facilitate coordina-
tion between the FWS and the Corps. To remedy the situation,
the Secretary of the Army entered into a I>1emorandum of
Understanding (MOU) with the Secretary of Interior. The
following 2 policies were adopted:
1. At the earliest practicable time the District
Engineer shall coordinate with the Regional
Directors of the Secretary of the Interior on
Fish and Wildlife, recreation and pollution
20
problems associated with dredging, filling and
excavation operations to be conducted under
permits issued under the 1899 Act in the Naviga-
ble waters of the U.S••.•
2. If the Secretary of Interior advises that proposed
operations will reasonably impair natural resources
or the related environment including the fish and
wildlife and recreational values thereof, or will
reduce the quality of such waters in violation of
applicable water standards, the Secretary of the
Army ..• wi11 either deny the permit or include
such conditions in the permit as h~ determines to
be in the public interest (emphasis added) ••.• 26
The MOU represents a pivotal point in the expansion
of the Corps responsibilities. While it recognizes that
the Secretary of the Army retains ultimate responsibility
for decisions on permit applications, the MOU is an official
reminder to the Corps' of its responsibility under the Fish
and Wildlife Coordination Act to obtain advice from Interior,
regarding impacts from proposed dredge and fill projects.
The MOU, therefore, laid the groundwork for direct negotia-
tion between the two departments. In addi t.i.on, the MOU re-
quires the Army to deny or modify RHA per~it applications
not in the best pUblic interest. This requirement has been
relied upon time and again in subseauent court decisions
..
which have drastically alt~red the Corps' regulatory juris-
diction.
In response to its commdtment.s in the Fish and Wild-
life Coordination Act and the recent MOU, the Corps promu1-
gated new regplations governing permits in navigable waters.
The new review criteria ensured that:
The decision as t.o whe1:her a permit will be issued
must rest on an evaluation of all relevant factors,
21
including the effect of the proposed work on navi-
gation, fish and wildlife, conservation, pollution,
aesthetics, ecology and the .general pUbli~ interest. 27
Zabel v. Tabb28
Soon after the promulgation of the Corps' first publi=
interest regulations, their validity was tested in court.
In Zabel v. Tabb, the court upheld the Corps' d~cision to
deny lUiA permits on public interest grounds eve~ though
the proposed construction would not hinder navigation. Examin-
ation of this landmark case helps to reveal what the public
interest includes in an actual decision making process.
Zabel and Russel owned land riparian to and under-
lying, Boca Ciega Bay, Florida, a navigable water of the
u.S. They applied to the Corps for a permit pursuant to
section 10 of the 1899 Act to dredge and fill eleven acres
of their tideland property for use as a con~e~cial trailer
park. App~oximately 700 citizens filed comments in opposi-
tion to the project. They were joined by several state
agencies and the u.S. Fish and Wildlife Service which op-
posed the permit because the proposed dredge and fill acti-
vities would harm the fish and wildlife resources of Boca
Ciego Bay.
The District Engineer at Jacksonville, Florida,
Colonel Tabb recommended that the permit be denied although
the proposed work would have no material affect on navi-
gation.
Careful consideration has been given to the general
pUblic interest in this case. The virtual unanimous
22
opposition to the proposed work ••• has convinced me
that approval of the application would not be in
the best pUblic interest. The continued opposition
of the u.s. Fish and Wildlife Service ••• leads me to
the conclusion that approval of the work would not
be consistent with the intent of Congress expressed
in the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act, as amended,
12 August 1958. Further the opposition of the State
of Florida and of county authorities •.• gives addi-
tional support to my conclusion that the work should
not be 2uthorized.2~ (emphasis added)
Consequently on 28 February 1967, the Secretary of the Army
denied the permit for the following reasons: It
1. would result in a distinctly harmful effect
on the fish and wildlife resources in Boca
Ciego Bay;
2. would be inconsistent with the purposes of
the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act of
1958, as amended (16 U.S.C. 662);
3. is opposed by the Florida Board of Conser-
vation on behalf of the State of Florida,
and by the county Health Board of Pinellas
County and the Board of County Commissioners
of Pinellas County; and
4. would be contrary to pUblic interest (emphasis
added) .30
The developers then sued for an injunction to compel
the Distric": Engineer to issue the permit. At trial, the
Corps contended that section 10 of the 1899 Act should be
understood in conjunction "ith the Fish and Wildlife Coordi-
nation Act, thereby giving the Corps discretionary authority
to deny an application for a dredge and fill permit despite
no impact to navigation. ~~he Federal District Court disagreed
d d d h h · 31an or ere t e Corps to grant t e perm1t.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fiftp
Circuit reversed, holding that the Secretary of Army could
refuse to authorize dredge and fill projects in navigable
23
waters for factually substantial ecological reasons even
though the project would not interfere with navigation,
flood control or the production of power. First, the court
cited the RHA in determining that factors other than navi-
gation could be considered.
The Act itself does not put any restrictions
on denial of a permit or the reasons why the Secretary
may refuse to grant a permit to one seeking to build
structures on or dredge and fill his own property.
Al though the Ac:t has always been read as tempering
the outright prohibition by the rule of reason
against arbitrary action, the Act does flatly forbid
the obstruction. The administrator may grant per-
mission on conditions and conversely deny permission
when the situation does not allow for those conditions.
But the statute does not prescribe either
generally or specifically what those conditions
-may be. The question for us is whether under the
Act the Secretary may include conservation consider-
ations as conditions to be met to make the proposed
project acceptable. Until now there has been no
absolute answer to this question. In fact, in most
cases under the Rivers and Harbors Act the Courts
have been facec only with navigational probl¢ms. 3 2
The court enphasized that the Corps no longer has to"wear
navigational blinders" when it considers a permit request.
Second, the court cited the commerce clause, Fish
and Wildlife Coordination Act and the National Environmental
Policy Act to buttress its position. The court further
held that Congress has the power to protect wildlife in
navigable waters and accordingly regulate the use of private
property for this reason. Congress, however, must be
reasonably sure that the activity regulated has' a substantial
33
effect on interstate commerce. The court concluded that
destruction of fish and wildlife in estuarine waters has a
24
substantial, even devastating, effect on interstate commerce.
Judge Brown used the 1egielative history of the Fish and
Wildlife Coordination Act to illustrate its applicability.
He concluded that the Coordination Act requires the Corps
to take Fish and Wildlife resources into account in the
decision making process. Furthermore, the court cited the
retroactive application of NEPA holding that NEPA requires
eve~y federal agency to ccnsider ecological factors when
reviewing activities which have an impact on the human envi-
ronment. Thus, the Court agreed with the Corps, holding that
consideration of the natural resource factors of the pUblic
interest was part of the Corps' responsibility in determining
whether or not to grant permits. 34 The 1968 public interest
regulations promulgated by the Corps were instrumental in
this decision.
National Environmental Policy AGt35
The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) was
the Congressional response to increasing pollution problems
and the resulting environmental degradation. Through the
Act, Congress attempted to Lncorporace er.'.vironmenta1 consi-
derations into fedelra1 agency decision mc;;.king processes. By
requiring En',ironmemta1 Impact Statements (EIS) for all major
actions significant:1y affecting the environment, NEPA forces
federal agencies to take a hard look at impacts resulting
from their projects.
The Act declares a national policy,
25
••• which will encourage productive and enjoyable
harmony between man and his environment; to promote
efforts which will eliminate damage to the environ-
ment and biosphere3ind to stimulate the health and
welfare of man ••••
To ensure adherance to this goal, NEPA directs, to the full-
est extent possible, the federal government to interpret
other policies, regulations and public laws in accordance
with those policies set forth in the Act. Hence, the Corps
must adhere to NEPA when considering whether or not to grant
permits for coastal alteration constituting a major federal
action.
Federal Water Pollution Control Act3?
The objective of the Federal Water Pollution Control
Act (FWPCA) is to restore and maintain the natural chemical,
physical, and biological integrity of the nation's waters.
The Act requires the discharge of pollutants to be eliminated
by 1985. The principal mechanism establi~hed for achieving
this goal is the National Pollution Discharge Elimination
System (NPDES) which requires the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPAl to regulate the discharge of pollutants into
navigable waters.
The inclusion of dredged material within the defi-
nition of pollutant:s created a potential overlap between the
new NPDES and Corps' traditional jur~sdiction under the RHA.
Congress, however, avoided this overlap by including section
404. The new secti.on authorized the Secretary of the Army,
acting through the Corps of Engineers, to regulate discharges
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f d d d . f~ll . 1 . 8 38o re ge or • mater~a ~nto u.. waters.
Although section 404 prevented EPA from taking over
the Corpsl permit authorities, ultimately the Agency had
great impact on the program. EPA contended that the federal
jurisdiction under the 1912 amendments extended to all waters
capable of affecting commerce regardless of whether navi~
gability could be established under traditional legal tests.
To support its position, EPA reminded the Chief of the Corps
39
of the jurisdictional milestone established in u.s. v. Holland~
In this case, the U.8. sought to enjoin land filling opera-
tions in mangrove swamps and mosquito canals. The court
restricted its consideration to the FWPCA and to whether
Congress intended the Act to cover pollution in non-naviga-
ble mosquito canals and wetlands.
The Court reviewed the legislative history of the
FWPCA and determined that Congress had Lrrt.erided to control
the discharg$ of pollutants at the source. In the Holland
case, the source of pollution was the la~d-filling opera-
tions in non-navigable mosquito ce.naLs , The Court concluded
that in order to control this pollution and implement Con-
gressional intent, the old navigability restriction had to
be removed. Consequently, i. t ir:J.tarp.r-eted the FWPCA to include
"all bodies including mainstreams and their tributaries.,,40
Corps jurisdiction would no longer be restricted to navigable
waters pursuant to the power under the commerce clause, but
would be increased to encompass all waters.
While the Corps willingly agreed that the FWPCA
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required it to regulate the filling of wetland,~,it was
adamently opposed to the Extension of its licensing authority
beyond the boundaries of navigable waters defined by the
commerce power. The Corps explained in a press release its
extreme reluctance to expand its jurisdiction.
Under some of the proposed regulations, federal
permits may be required by the rancher who wants
to enlarge his stock pond, or the farmer who wants
to deepen an irrigation ditch, or .the mountaineer
who wants to p~otect his land against stream erosicn. 4l
Furthermore, the Corps interpreted legislative history and
insisted that EPA had regulatory responsibility for dredge
and fill projects outside of traditional navigable waters.
In accordance with its position, the Corps' 1974 revised
..
regulations maintained the preexisting jurisdictional limi-
tations. 42 This resistance was successfully challenged in
43NRDC, Inc. v. Calloway when the federal court for the
Dis':rict of Columbia ordered the Corps to amend its juris-
diction uncer section 404 of the FWPCA to include all waters
of the U.S., not merely navigational waters.
The Ho1.lcm:1and Callaway~da.cisions represent an extra-
polation of Congressional intent. The legislative history
of section 404 indicates t.hat Congress was primarily concerned
wi th the disposal of pol l.c.t.ed dredge spoils. Destruction
of wetlands by these activities was not specifically addressed. 44
In both cases, however, the courts relied upon the purpose
of the FWPCA to justify a literal reading of section 404 •
••• subsection tcl provides for careful consideration
of whether or not such discharges will have 'unac-
ceptable adverse effect on municip~l wat7r suppli7s,
shellfish beds and fishery areas (1nclud1ng spawn1ng
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and breeding areas}, wildlife or recJ:eational areas.
~hese three 'sections do not by themselves prove
conclusively that Congress sought to assume juris-
diction over activities taking place in wetlands
above the mean high water line. What these sections
do reveal is a sensitivity to the value of coastal
breeding ground •••
••• the FWPCA embodies the realization that pollution
of these areas may be ecologically fatal.
In an attempt to combat these threats to the
coastal enviror~ent, the Congress broadened its
jurisdiction to encompass 'all waters of the United
States. In doing so Congress deemed it e~sential
that the discharge of pollutants be controlled at
the source. I Legislative History Vol. 2, p. 1495 •• ~.
One of the sources of pollution ••• (is) the discharge
of sand, dirt and dredged spoil on land, although
above the mean high water line (is) periodically
inundated. 45
The Holland and Calloway decisions effectively designated
the .Corps as "guardian of the nat.Lon ' s wetlands". 46
While the previous discussion does not have direct
bearing on the evolution of public review crit~ria, it is,
nevertheless, important to note for two reasons:
First, it represents another instance where the Corps·
juri.sdiction was greatly expanded: this time to include
regulation of dredge and fill ac t LvI ties in all wetlands.
The Court decisions and jurisdictional alterations clearly
demonstrate a judicial desire to conserve valuable wetlands
and to reflect these concerns inthe decision making process.
Second, in response to court interpretations, the Corps prom-
ulgated regulations to include wetlands, along with public
interest review crit.eria, in its general policies for evalu-
ating permit applications.
25}
1977 Clean Water Act47
In adopting the 1977 amendments to the FWPCA, Congress
made a number of major changes in~e dredge and fill pro-
gram. Most importantly, Congress retained the broad juris-
dictional approach advocat~d by both EPA and the courts in
regulating the discharges of dredge and fill material. 48
However, Congress allowed states, with federally approved
dredge and fill per~it programs, to take over permit res-
ponsibi1ity for waters within state jurisdiction (those
waters, traditionally non-navigable and above the mean
high water mark) thereby releasing the Corps from its
unwanted responsibility outside of navigable waters pursuant
t th ' d th clause. 49o e power un er e commerce
The 1977 amendments did little to affect the public
interest review, therefore, no further discussion will be
devoted to the Act as amended. Table 1 providep a summary
,
of significant even~s in the Corps' coastal regulatory
program.
( J\
TABLE 1
Significant EventR in the Corps' Coastal Regulatory Program
(
Year
1802
1877
Legislation
Congressional Act creating
the Corps
Dolph Bill proposed to
protect harbors from ran-
dom development
Regulation Court Case
l88ij
1890
1896
Williamette Iron Bridge Co. v.
Hatch provides impetus to en-
act the Dolph Bill
First Rivers and Harbors
Act
Proposed revisions to the
Rivers and Harbors Act
w
o
1899
1940
Rivers and Harbors Act ..,
requires Corps to maintain
navigation free from ub- I
struction
•
U.S. v. Appalachian Electric
Power Co. expands the naviga-
bility definition to be as
broad as the needs of commerce
( (
TABLE 1 -- continued
(
Year
1958
1960
Legislation
Fish and Wildlife Coordina-
tion Act requires the Corps
to consult with FWS
Regulation Court Case
u.s. v~__~~~blic Steel
~. expands the term
refuse to include
industrial pollution
1968
1969
1970
First public interest regu-
lations promulgated
National Environmental
Policy Act requires the .Corps.
to file environmental im-
pact statements for coastal
alteration constituting a
major federal action
abel v. Tabb allows
orps to deny permits
for factually subs tan-
~ia1 ecological reasons
~ven though the projectou1d not interfere Iith navigation
w
....
1972 IFederal Water Pollution
Control Act authorizes the
Corps to regulate dredge
and fill activities in u.s.
waters
( (
TABLE 1 -- continued
(
Year
1974
1975
1976
Legislation Reguiation Court Case
u.s. v. Holland removes
the old navigability
restriction and inter-
prets FWPCA to include
all bodies of water
NRDC, Inc. v. Calloway
requires Corps to amend
its jurisdiction to in-
clude all bodies of
water w
I\,)
1977 I Clean Water Act upholds
the broad jurisdictional
approach
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Permit Process Structure
An examination of the current permit processing
structure and the pUblic interest review will conclude the
chronological history of the Corps' jurisdictional expan-
sion in the coastal zone.
The Corps is broken down into 36 different district
offices each commanded by a colon~l. The colonel of each
district is responsible to one of the eleven division com-
manjers, usually a brigadier or major general. In turn,
the division commanders report to the Chief of the Corps,
who is ultimately responsible to the Secretary of the Army.
Applicants wishing to dredge or fill must apply to
the appropriate District Engineer having jurisdiction over
waters in which the activity is pxoposed , The contents of
the application must include a cmlplete description of the
proposed activity including the necessary approvals required
b th F d 1 d 1 1 . 50Y 0 er e era, state an oca agenc1es.
In addition, the applicant must include a thorough
description of the type, composition and quantity of the
material to be dreeged as well as disposal plan. Additional
information deemed necessary by the District Engineer to
evaluate the application must also be suPPlied. 51 The
District Engineer then issues a public notice describing
the project and stating criteria for evaluation. After
considering all the public comments, he determines whether
or not an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) will be
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required. An EIS must be prepared if the District Engineer
believes that a permit may be warranted but that the pro-
posed activity would significantly affect the quality of
the human environment.
As required by NEPA, the EIS must contain the
following information:
1. the ervironme~ta1 impact of the proposed ~ctivity;
2. any adverse unavoidable effects;
3. alternatives to the proposed action r
4. relationship between the local short term use of
man's environment and the maintenance and enhancement
of long term productivity;
5. any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of
resources.
5 2
The District Engineer makes the initia~ decision to
grant or deny the permit based on the recommendations from
his multi-disciplinary staff which includes lawyers, bio-
10gists and recreational specialists. Based on the criteria
which the Ccrps must evaluate with each application and
provided no unresolved substantive objections arise, the
District Engineer may grant the permit. Controversial Gases,
however, are referrE~d to the next h LezaxchLcaL level. If,
at the division level, objec~ions from another federal agency
remain unresolved, or when the recommended decision is con-
trary to the stated position of the governor of the state,
f h . 53the case is forwarded to the Chief 0 t e Eng1neers.
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Denial of the permit by the Corps is authorized
when:
1. the state prohibits certification under Section 401
of the FWPCAi 54
2. the proposed work will excessively interfere with
navigation pursuant to sections 9 and 10 of the RHAi
3. the permit is determined tQ be contrary to the pUblic
interest. 55
Public Interest Review
Within the Corps' regulations, under the heading
"General Policies for Evaluating Permit Applications", the
public interest review is the first policy discussed.
The policy requires the Corps to base its decisions to grant
or deny pe::11lits on an "evaluation of the probabl~ impact of
the proposed activity and its intended use on the public
56interest." In order to accomplish this, the Corps must,
first, dis~:inguish the public int:arest fflctors specific to
each partieular proposal. Second, the benefits to the public
interest relsulting from the proposed activity must be balanced
against the reasonable forseeable detriments to public
interest. For exa::nple, consider a proposal which calls for
alteration of a natural beach to facilitate energy pro-
duction. ~~he project will obviously have different effects
on two fact.ors of the public interest. It will have nega-
tive impacts on recreational opportunity while simultaneously
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enhancing energy production. The decision to authorize,
deny or modify the project will result from the general
balancing process required by the regulations.
All factors which_may be considered relevant to the
proposal must be considered; among those are conser-
vation, economics,~~hetics, general environmental
concerns, historic values, fish and wildlife values,
flood d::unage prevention, land use, navigation, re-
creation, water supply, water quality, energy needs,
safe food production, and, in general, the needs and
welfare of the people. No permit will be granted un-
less its issuance is found to be in the public interest.
The following general criteria will be con-
sidered in the evaluation of every application:
(i) the relative extent of the pUblic and pri-
vate need for the proposed structure or work;
(ii) the desirability of using appropriate alter-
native locations and methods to accomplish
the objective of the proposed structure or
work;
(iii) the extent and permanence of the beneficial
and/or detrimental effects which the proposed
structure or work may have on the public and
private uses to which an area is suited; and
(Lv) the probably impact of each proposal in relation
to the cumulative effect created by other
eXisting and anticip~ged structures or work
in the general area.
Discussion
A simple examination of the pUblic interest regu-
lations reveals their broad focus and leaves the evaluation
with many substantive procedural questions. How is the
review applied in actual cases? How does the Corps strike a
balance between opposing factors of public interest? How
comprehensive are the regulations and what is the extent
of their scope? While it is impossible to thoroughly dis-
cuss all questions raised 'lithin the bounds of this study,
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those most relevant: to the study I s purpoe.e will be addressed.
First, however, the following examples will be presented in
order to delineate both the meaning and applicability of
the public interest review.
Two Implementation Examples
Marc:o Island
The Marco Island project helps to ill~strate the Corp's
definition of public interest. It also helps to discern
the relationship between the process involved in determining
whether or not to grant permits and the factors of pUblic
interest.
In 1973, the Deltona Corporation applied to the Corps
for section 10 RHA and section 404 fWPCA permits to dredge
18.2 million cubic yards from navigable waters around Marco
Island and to deposit the material in approxi~ately 2100
acres of mangrove wetlands. The permits would enable Deltona
to complete the final phase of its Marco Isla~d master plan
by providing single family housing for 35,000 individuals.
Phase 1 of the plan began in 1964 after the Corps issued
the necessary permits. In 1967, when construction of the first
phase was nearly complete, Deltona applied for permits to
begin phase 2 of the development scheme. The FWS, however,
objected to the second phase permits. Although a two year
59delay ensued, the permits were ultimately granted. By
the time Deltona was ready to begi~ the final 3 phases of
construction (1973) and applied for sections 10 and 404
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permits, the new regulations and legislation previously dis-
cussed were in full effect. The Corps was, therefore,
obligated to scrutinize the permits very closely and deter-
mine whether or net the best public interest would be served
by granting them. The permit applications proved to be
qui te controversial. In favor of the permit~ loIlere the Oepart-·
ment of Labor and the Board of County Commissioners, Hendry
County. Opposition came from 2,300 correspondents, not
to mention 31 petitions, the State Game and Fresh Water
Fish Commission, National Marine Fisheries Service, FWS,
National Park Service, EPA, Town of Longboat Key, City of
Sanibel and City of Naples. The controversy was exacer-
bated by the Deltona Corporation which continued to sell
lots despite the fact that the permits had net yet been
granted.
The EIS listed the following neg~tive impacts which
would result from the issuance of the permats.
1. destruction of approximately 2,200 acres of mangroves~
2. short: terms water quality degradation from dredge and
fill operations as weLl, as long term impacts resulting
from urbanization.
3. commercial sport fishing reductions due to habitat loss
f ~ . f d h ° 60o tIre pr~a~y 00 c a1n.
In April of 1976, ~:he Chief of the Engineers authorized the
Jacksonville district to issue permits for one of the three
sections but to deny the other two. The reasons, listed as
factors of pUblic interest in the Corps' report, are as
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follows:
1. Corps Wetlands Policy - In determining whether
a particular alteration is necessary~ our regu-
lations require that we determine if the
activity is dependent upon wetland resources
and whether feasible alternate sites exist.
2. EPA Guidlines - The permits failed the test of
the EPA Guidlines, 404(b) which state that
destruction of aquatic resources by filling
operations in wetlands is consider~d the most
severe environmental impact covered. The Corps
responded by pointing out that rec~eational
housing does not require a location in wetlands.
While a derived benefit of such ho~~ing may be
an opportunity to recreate in or near the water
resource, the basic purpose of6it i~ still
the same: to provide shelter.
The Corps thoroughly incorporated the public interest
review mandate into the Marco Island decision making process
and in so doing, provided insight into how the general
criteria are used to evaluate the public interest. The
following discussion will briefly reiterate factors in the
Corps decision and show how they were evaluated using the
pUb?;.ic interest review criteria.
1. the relative extent of the public and private need for
the proposed structure:
Although the majority of the responses received
by the Corps opposed the pr()posal, those whom Deltona
had already Bold lots to were strongly in favor.
Letters were received from as far away as Wisconsin
pleadipg for the permits to be granted. Most of these
individuals had planned to retire on Marco Island and
the health of some depended on the warm climate. They
felt they represented a legitimate need for the project.
4.
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While the Corps recognized these cbmpelling arguments,
it determined that benefits which would be received
by a small portion Of the private sector did not
warrant the widespread destruction of wetlands and
fish and wildlife resources.
2. desirability of using appropriate alternative locations
and nethods to accomplish the objective of the pro-
posed work:
Alternative locations for the proposed project
were available within the country. Furt~ermore,
housing, recreational or otherwise, serves the same
basic function - to provide shelter. The Corps
determined that shelter does not require a wetlands
location.
3. the extent and permanence of the bene f LcLaL and/or
detrimental effects which the proposed structure
would have on pUblic and private U8es to which the
area is suited:
Detrimental impacts Lnc Iudec, the permanent loss
of 21\)0 acres of productive wetlands, p.robabLy long-
term ~ecline of fish and wildlife resources dependent
upon ene wetlands, and water quality degradation.
Housing for 35,000 constituted the beneficial impacts.
The land area, however, was not particularly well
suited for this purpose.
the p+obable impact of each proposal in relation to
the cumulative impacts:
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The proposal would remove .5 percent of Florida's
mangrove wetlands. The mangroves in question serve im-
portant biological functions (including food chain
production, general habitat, spawning, rearing and
resting sites for aquatic and land species). In
addition, wetlands act as sanctuaries and signifi-
cantly shield other areas from wave action, erosion
or storm damage. Destruction of 2100 acres of these
valuable wetlands would constitute an impact with
unmeasurable ramifications.
Block "M"
In 1973, the Block "M" Corporation applied for a 404
dredge and fill permit in the Gulf of Mexico near Hudson,
Floriday. The application requested permission to dredge
170,000 cubic yards and to fill a~d bulkheard 12 acres for a
conc.ominium housing development. Objections rai.sed by
~, FWS and local residents were based on:
1. environmental grounds;
2. the effects of a condominium in a small community;
3. six fold expansion of a sewage treatment plant where
62there was really no area in which to expand.
h i f ' 'I k 'G 1 . 63TeD rector 0 C~v~ Wor s, MaJor enera Morr~s
denied the permits stating:
We have reviewed this permit file in conjunction
with the Corps policy on the protection of wetlands
which was promulgated and published in the Federal
Register on 3 April 1974. The policy now requires,
as a matter of law, that unless the public interest
42
requires otherwise, permit applications for activities
in valuable wetlands must be denied unless it can
be concluded that the benefits of the proposed
wetlands alteration will outweigh the damage to the
wetlands resource and that the proposed alteration
is necessary to realize those benefits ••••
(T)he applicant has failed to establish that the
siting of this proposed housing development at
this wetlands location is dependent on this wetlands
resource. In addition, the applicant has failed to .
establish that there are no other feasible alternative
sites for multi-family housin·:J of this type in this
area. Accordingly, we have been unable to conclude
from the record that this proposed activity is a necessary
alteration of this wetlands resource. [Emphasis added]64
The Block "M" Case also demonstrates the importance
placed on wetlands as a pUblic interest value. Although
the amount of proposed alteration was considerably less
than in the Marco Island example, the preservation of 12
acres of wetlands was deemed to be more in the pUblic
interest than condominium housing. From both examples, it
can be concluded that alteration 0f highly productive wet-
lands for housing development is no t, in the public interest.
The justification for wetlands preservation in these cases
focused on the direct and indirect impacts to fishery
resources, Corps and EPA regulations.
Neither case, however, forced the Corps to confront
more difficult pUblic interest issues. Such issues include
Corps review of projects which indirectly but substantially
impact fisheries without alteration of productive wetlands.
For example, a housing development, sewage treatment plant,
or oil refinery may require Corps' dredge and fill permits
even though no wetlands alteration will occur. These pro-
jects may cause real harm to local fisheries from sewage
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discharge, refinery effluent or oil spills. Public interest
regulations do not provide clearly defined standards
which express how much emphasis should be given to more
important but secondary impacts in a decision making
process. The public interest review also fails to provide
mechanisms to balance opposing factors of public interest
within a given proj~ct. Without the clear gui~ance of
the Corps' wetlands mandate, the public interest review may
be much more difficult to apply.
Surranary
Discussion thus far has focused on the role of the
Corps 'in coastal alteration decision making processes.
Judicial interpretations and current legislation have
successively broadened the Corps' permit jurisdiction tc
reflect public interest values alien to its navigational
mandate. Regardless of the applicability of the commerce
power, the Corps now has the authority to deny permits
which are not deemed to be in the best public interest.
The determination of the public interest is also intri-
cately linked with other requirements found in the Fish
and Wildlife Coordination Act and with Department of
Interior. Hence, in evaluating applications for section
10 and section 404 permits, the Corps must consider an
incredible amount of input and public interest factors
in order to make a well balanced decision.
The next part of this study will examine how the
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Corps implemented its public interest review in the Hampton
Roads refinery example.
CHAPTER IV
HAMPTON ROADS REFINERY
Refinery Complex and Chesapeake Bay Resources
Refinery Complex
The Hampton Roads Energy Company (HREC) in March,
1975,app1ied for Department of Army permits for proposed
construction of a refinery and marine terminal. The
refinery, initially designed to process 175,000 barrels of
crude oil per day would eventually be expanded to produce
a co~bined total of more than seven million gallons of low
sulfur gasoline, jet fuel, butane, propane and other re-
1ated products per day. Typical Middle East crude would
be used as a feed stock.
The marine terminal would 'oe capabLe of handling
two 85,000 dead weight tons (DWT) tankers for incoming
crude and two small tankers or barges for outgoing products
simultaneously. An oil spill containment system is to be
permanently installed to co~p1ete1y surround each tanker or
barge prior to loadings and un10adings. 65
The mooring area and access channel will be dredged
to accomodate the refinery complex. The 3.4 million cubic
yards of dredge material would be deposited in the nearby
Craney Island Disposal Area.
The project would employ an extensive wastewater
45
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treatment Bystem which captures rainwater draining from all
parts of the site in order to remove pet't'oleum products and
other contaminants. The treated wastewater would then be
discharged into the Elizabeth River. 66
Since a portion of the complex work will affect
navigable ",aters, Department of A'":my permits pursuant t.o
section 10 of the River and Harbors Act and section 404
of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act are required.
This work includes: (1) construction of marine terminals,
(2) dredging of the tanker and barge mooring areas and
access channels, and (3) installation of an oil spill con-
67tainment system.
In addition to the Department of Army permits, EPA
and three state agencies have permitting authority for the
construction and operating phases of the complex. The
agencies ar..d their authorities are listed in Ta.ble 2.
\
(Agency
Environmental Protection
Agency, EPA
State Air Pollution Control
Board, SAPCB
State Water Control Board,
SWCB
Virginia Marine Resources
Commission, VMRC
(
TABLE 2
Non Army Permits
Permit
Prevention of Significant Air
Quality Deterioration, PSD
New industrial source
Certificate of Compliance
National Pollution Discharge
Elimination System, NPDES
Dredge and fill
(
Purpose
Regulates sulfuroxide and
particulate emissions
Construction and operation
of certain new sources of
air pollution emissions.
Must comply with EPA Na-
tional Ambient Air Quality
Standards, (NAAQ5)
Ensures that proposed
dredging and construction
activities comply with
water quality standards
and Virginia Water Control
laws
Regulates discharge of
pollutants into water from
a point source
Regulates construction of
piers, docks and other ac-
tivities in state waters
,;:.
....,J
SOURCE: OASA (CW), "Evaluation of the HRECo Permit Case -- A
Proposed Refinery and Terminal Complex to be constructed in Ports-
mouth, Virginia," 1979, p.8.
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While the state permit process complicated the Corps'
permit review and increased delay, the rEal so~rce of de-
lay resulted from unresolved objections, particularly from
the Department of Interior. Most of these objections arose
out of concern for the commercial and recreational fishery
resources of the Chesapeake. Accordingly a brief overview
of the Chesapeake's resources is warranted.
The Chesapeake Bay - A Unique Resource
The Chesapeake Bay is the largest estuary in the
United States and one of the most productive in the world.
The lower bay and its associated estuaries provide essen-
tial spawning, nursery and feeding grounds for most of the
bay's commercial and recreational species. Of primary
value are oysters, blue crabs, finfish and waterfowl. 68
The oyster and bluecrab industries not only contribute
to the local economies but have national importance as well.
The Bay produces 40 percent of the total U.S. harvest of
oysters and at least 50 percent of the nation's harvest of
cluecarbs. In 1977, these harvests amounted to 17 and 60
million pounds bringing a retail value of $48 and $39 million
respectively. 69 The major populations of both organisms are
located within close proximity to either the proposed refinery
or navigation channels to the refinery. Figures 4 and 5
diagram the position of the lucrative oyster beds and reveals
their proximity to the refinery.
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Fig. 4. Oyster Setting Areas
SOURCE: U.S. Coast Guard, Local Oil Contingency Plan for MSO Hampton Roads,
{Norfolk, Virginia), March 1979, p.13.
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SOURCE: U.S. Coast Guard, Local Oil Contingency Plan for"MSO Hampton Roads,
(Norfolk, Virginia), 1 March 1979, p.12.
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The beds, which supply at least 75 percent of all
seed oysters transplanted to other growing ar~as in Virginia
and neighboring states, are considered by the Virginia Insti-
tute of Marine Sciences (VIMS) to be unique and irrep1aceab1eo
Likewise, the b1uecrab over wintering grounds ~ear
the Hampton Roads ~arbor approach channels are also con-
sidered to be peer1ess. 70 See Figure 6 for the locaticn of
the b1uecrc.b spawning areas.
(
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Fig. 6. Blue Crab Spawning Areas
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SOURCE: National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration, Position
Statement on the Siting of an Oil Refinery by the Hampton Roads Energy Company at
Portsmouth, Virginia, December, 1978, p.27.
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Widespread throughout the Chesapeake Bay are saline,
brackish and freshwater wetlands. Such wetlands form the
primary basis for the high natural productivity for which
the Bay is famous. Oysters and bluecrabs as well as finfish
inhabi ting the bay depend directly or indirect.ly on the wet-
lands for their food source. In addition, wetlands provide
habitat for' invertebrates, fish, birds and mammals; buffer
the effects of storm generated waves by stabilizing the
shoreline; and function as natural fillers for the removal
71 72
of pollutants. '
The Bay's value as.a recreational resource should not
go unnoticed. Recreational use of the lower Chesapeake Bay
and Hampton Roads area is intensive. Activities include
"beaching", boating and fishing. While no figures are readily
available for Virginia, in 1977 the Maryland D~partment of
Natural Resources estimated the economic impact of recrea-
tional boating on the state economy as a lrpos t; $370 million a
,
73year. Recreational fishing is a particularly important Bay
dependent industry. Its value, well over $100 million annually
is equal to that of the commercial fishery catch. 74
Concern has been expressed by several federal agencies
along with VrMS that oil spills resulting from refinery stimu-
lated tanker and barge traffic could cause harm to the
Chesapeake's valuable resources. The extent of this damage,
if any, however is unknown. Refinery opponents argued that
the risk posed by the refinery to these resources would be
too great implying that the industry and fisheries are
\--
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mutually exclusive. In addition, they cited other public
interest factors which they believed were sufficient to
warrant permit denial. However refinery advocates also
cited various public interest considerations which supported
their position. The following discussion delineates the
conflict of interests.
Conflict of Interest75
Refinery Proponents
National Need
Proponents of the refinery, notably the Departments
of Energy, Treasury and Defense along with the city of
Portsmouth and business organizations, cited three public
interest benefits which would result from the project.
1. The decrease in outflow of U.s. dollars to foreign
oil suppliers would be the ?rincip~l benefit of domestic
refinery to the national economy. A net national
saving would be derived from the difference between
the high price per barrel of imported products and
the comparatively lower price of imported crude.
2. Department of Energy statistics show that 86 percent
of all refined products imported to the U.s. come to
the East Coast, which at present, has a refinery
capacity capable of satisfying only 23 percentt of the
product dema~d. Half of the remaining supply needed
cames fram the Gulf Coast refineries and the remaining
25 percent from imports. The East Coast, therefore,
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pays between $.60 - $1.00 more per barrel than the
costs of similar products on the GUlf. 7 6 A major
East Coast refinery would help to equalize the cost
differential and therefore constitute a savings.
Increased refining capacity would also ease exces-
sive hardships to the East Coast in times of supply
interruption.
3. The new refinery would enhance the national secu-
rity by adding storage facilities to the Strategic
Petroleum Reserve (SPR). The SPR functions as a
supply source for the country during times of supply
interruptions or embargoes.
Local Benefits
The Final Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS)
emphasized the value of the refinery to the local economy
as a secondary benefit. The construction phase would
provide employment for 3,030 different workers with esti-
mated earnings of about $50 million. The refinery and
marine terminal would perm~nently employ approximately 500
individuals totalling an a::mual payroll of $7 , 500 ,00. An
estimated 500 supporting jobs are also expected to result
from the project. The refinery will generate approximately
$5 million annually in tax revenues, $3 million of which
will go to the city of portsmouth.??
State-of-the-Art-Technology
Proponents argued that the pollution control tech-
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nology utilized by HREC would prevent excessive degradation
of air and water quality. They disputed clau1s that the
refinery would cause irreparable harm to the Bay's living
resources or fishing industries. Supporters note, in parti-
culcir, the sophisticated oil spill containment system and
waste processing facility. The q6ntainment system which
surrounds each vessel is also equipped with booms and barriers
to corral any oil escaping the primary system. Portable
skimmers will be employed to remove spilled oil from the
water surface. These pollution control measures prompted
the Virginia Institute of Marine Science (VIMS) to conclude
that spills occuring within the compounds of the marine termi-
nal would be of minor concern.
Initially, HREC proposed to have its sewage processed
in a nearby sewage treatment plant (STP). VIMB, however
expressed considerable concern over the proposed use of a
municipal STP to process refinery wastes for ~wo reasons.
First, STP's are ill-equipped to treat refinery wastes; and
second, the resultant effluent would be discharged upstream
from the James River oyster beds. In response to criticism,
HREC revised its proposal to include on site construction of
a processing plant designed specifically for refinery wastes.
Effluent monitoring would be conducted by HREC to ensure that
b 1 bl tm t levels. 79effluent stays e ow accepta e trea en
In addition, the refinery will be engineered to employ
the current state-of-the-art air quality equipment in order to
80
minimize emission leaks to the atmosphere.
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Refinery Opponents
Despite the benefits cited by the proponents and the
pollution control technol,)gy employed, there was wides?read
opposition to the refinery. Federal resistance was led by
001, NOAA, and EPA, while CARE and the Oyster Packers and
Planters Association spearheaded the local resistance.
Table 3 provides an overview of the state's political
sentiment.
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TABLE 3
Political Support
Political Officers Pro Con
Representative Daniel X
Representative Trible X
Representative Whitehurst X
Senator Byrd No position
Senator Warren No position
Governor Dalton X
SOURCE: OASA(CW), "Evalutation of the HRECo Permit
Case ~- A Proposed Refinery and Terminal Complex to be
Constructed in Portsmouth, Virginia", p.94.
National Need
According to opponents, the national need for in-
creased U.S. refining capacity is speculative. The June
1979 GAO report entitled "'I'he u.s , Refining Capacity in a
Changing World Oil Environment," suggests that, due to the
insecurity of foreign crude supplies, federal pqlicies
affecting oil investments would best be directeq to expansion
of domestic suppliers rather than construction of new refin-
ery capacity.8l Since the HREC refinery will be dependent
upon the Middle East for its source of crude supply, oppo-
nents argue that the refinery will be subject to political
supply disruptions.
Moreover, the u.S. refining capacity has decreased
.~.
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over the years. In 1930., more than 600 refineries were
operating in this country while in 1975 only 275 were still
producing. 82 Growth, averaging about 5 percent per year,
has been attributed almost entirely to additions in existing
refinery capacity. In addition, GAO and other authorities
pradict a decline in gas consumption by 19B5 due to auto-
mobile miieage requirements. B3 Hence, the chairman of the
Old Dominion University Economics Department concluded
that reactivation of an old refinery would be wiser than con-
struction of the HREC complex. While concurring with the
cost of transportation argument, the chairman contended that
harm to the multi-million dollar commercial fishing industry
" ld . k 1 . d . h . 8 4cou qU1C y 1rra 1cate t ose sav1ngs.
Local Need
The addition of 500 jobs is a tiny portion of the
Po~tsmouth 40,000 member labor force. Most of the jobs
will require advanced levels of skill and technical abilities,
much of which will not be available locally. Consequently,
the HREC facility will not become a panacea for the city's
hardcore unemployment problem. While additional revenue
may well indeed boost Portsmouth's financial status, in the
long run this may be questionable. Middle to upper class
residents, directlY. affected by deteriorating air and water
quality, may move to the suburbs to escape the inconvenience
and the loss in property value. The establishment of a petro-
chemical plant could discourage high income brackets from
remaining in or returning to the city •
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The negative externalities were not calculated in the
cost/benefit analysis nor were the spi.llover costs to surround-
ing cities estimated.
Air Quality and Health
The refinery emissions would consist p~imarily of
hydrocarbons, sulfur, and nitrous oxides. Hydrocarbon
emissions react synergistically wi.th othE'ir elements in the
atmosphere to form photochemical oxidants. Photochemical
oxidant concentrations in the Hampton Roads area already
violate the National Ambient Air quality Standards. Hydro-
carbon emissions also pose health hazards. Many local
physicians objected to the refinery because of the correla-
tion between petroleum manufacturing industries ~nd the
amounts of lung, nasal and skin cancer.
Underestimation of the Likelihood of Spills
Hampton Roads is a major port of entry, as well as a
center for one of the world's largest Naval operation.
Approximately 79,000 vessels moved through this port annually
between 1970 and 1973. (The number of U.S. naval vessel
movements are· not available for security reasons.) Con-
struction of the proposed refinery would result in a substan-
tial increase in both number of vessel movement and the
volume of petroleum transported through the area.
The facility will require an annual average of 798
barges and 123 tankers loadings to deliver refined products
within the Bay and along the East Coast. The FElS estimates
an increase of 2.1 to 2.6 percent in total vessel movement
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and 22.5 - 33.5 percent increase in oil tanker and barge
8=traffic within the Hampton Roads area. Most of the
finished products will be transported by barges which have a
86fairly high aocLdent; rate in Chesapeake Bay. NOAA com-
missioned Engineering Computer optecnomics, Inc. (ECO) to
study the traffic patterns and spill pro~abilities in the
Bay witn and without a refinery. The ECO report projeqted
an average oil spill of 1,290 barrels every eight years from
barges associated with the facility and an average spill of
7,710 barrels every 9.2 years from tankers. A catastrophic
spill is predicted to occur once in 50 years. 87 ECO found
that accident rates of large tankers which will service the
retinery, to be greater than 9 times what is presently
servicing the Hampton Roads port. Furthermore, worldwide
accident rate statistics show a n~arly 3 fold increase over
88the world average in tanker casualties wi.thin Hampton Roads.
001 has advised that the t::hesapeake Bay is already
stressed by the cumulative effects of nearly 800 petroleum
spills per year and that every increasing oil transportation
on the Bay is incompatible with the continued health and
survival of the unique and irreplaceable fish and wildlife
resources.
Tanker and barge movements in and out of
this region would create spills of crude oil
and of refinery products. Of that we may be
certain, for there are no foolproof systems to
avoid them. We need not get into a numbers game
about probabilities; it is enough to say that there
would be damage, and that it would continue, and
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that some of it would be cumulative and could not
be reversed. 89
Allegations have been made by NOAA and others that
the probability of spills has been severely underestimated.
Besides the enhanced risks of spills from increased vessel
traffic, concern has been expressed over the ability of the
Coast Guard to reduce the occurance of spills. Already,
the Bay region has suffered from too many uncontained spills
which continually jeopardize the shellfish industry.90
The Maryland Water Resources Board has registered numerous
complaints about the Coast Guard's apparent inability or
unwillingness to take immediate action to contain and clean
up spills. 9l This problem, in part, may be att~ibuted to
the scant manpower the Coast Guard could summon to arrest a
spill before it got out of hand as well as the primitive
92state-of-the-art oil spill containment systems. The re-
mainder of the problem rests with the inability of Coast
Guard regulations to alleviate human error, the cause of so
'd t 93many acc~ en s.
Underestimation of Spill Impacts
National Marine Fisheries Service and Fish and Wild-
life Service are highly critical of Army studies estimating
the impacts of oil spills. Both insist that Army studies:
(1) use cost figures from spills in a less restrictive eco-
system (i.e. the ocean rather than estuarine areas), (2)
"substantially underestimated the impact of petroleum on
oyster seed beds and other marine life using safe levels of
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petroleum contamination considerably higher than literature
supports",94 and (.3) lack recognition of the value of resources
in the lower Bay and their. vulnerability to predictable
refinery related spills.
The two services relief on a body of oil toxicity
studies conducted by VIMS on the ~hesapeake Bay as well as
similar works conduc t.ed by Woods Hole and ot.her oceanographic
institutions. Their data did not support the Corps' oil
impact evaluation. The Corps was criticized for selectively
choosing baseline data which at times was extremely outdated
(same references pre-date 1930) and geographically irrelevant
95(nalveston Bay, Texas). As a result, tremendous dis-
crepancies existed between the conclusions of the Army and
those of other agencies.
Economic Impacts
Economic evaluation of the commer-cial resources and
associated industries present yet another area of dispute.
Opposition to the refinery contin~ally emphasized the verity
of commercial fisheries value against the questionable economic
benefits which would be attributable to the refinery.
Approximately 23,200 individuals are employed either
full or part-time as commercial fishermen, while perennial
employment in the 373 fish processing plants accounts for
7,363 jobs increasing to 10,154 during peak seasons.
Dockside vqlue of the shellfish harvested in 1977 is $78
n i: 96m1 10n.
Oil spill damage to these industries is difficult to
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predict because it would depend on the time of year, the volume
and type of spill, geographical location, meteorological and
oceanic conditions as well as clean up capacity at the time
of the spill. The interdependence of the industries, however,
along with the large numbers of people affected led NOAA, EPA,
and Dor to believe ".:hat the cost of a catastrophic spill would
exceed the positive economic benefits generate'\i by the r-efLnerv ,
~tuch discussion of economic benefit has been based
on the advantages of locati.ng a refinery near its market.
However, the current demand for petroluem and derivative pro-
ducts, with the exception of crude and residual fuel oil,
has not been established within the Hampton Roads area.
Hence, analysis of economic return is purely speculative.
Alternative Sites
In May, 1978, the Chief of the Corps, Lt. Gen. John
Morris, concluded that refinery alternatives had not been
sufficiently studied. The Army, therefore, appointed an inter-
agency task force, including representatives fJ~om the Depart-
ments of Interior, Energy, Transportation, the EPA, NOAA,
and COE, to evaluate 69 potential alternative refinery sites
fram Maine to Florida using environmental, economic and en-
gineering criteria. A series of descriptions were generated
which included many of the pUblic interest factors and were
used to comp~re sites. See Table 6 for a list of descriptors.
65
TABlE 6
-
categories General Specific
Descriptors Descriptors
Ecanrn1i.cs Site Land costs
Envirormmt mi.tigation
costs
Utility costs
Operation Location construction
factor
Crude receiving cost
Product receiving cost
Market relationship
Enviroment Physical Air quality
Water supply
Noise
Waste disposal
Potential for oil spi.Lls
Dredging
Spoil disposal
Flood plains
FloCd hazards
EcolocJical Threatended or endanqer-
ed species
Terrestrial species
Aquatic species
Crucial habitats
Wetlands
Socdoeoorzmi.c Agricultural lard
Ccmnercial fisheries -
Sport fisher.i.es
Recreaticn
Land use
State/local govern-
trent approvaf,
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TABLE 6 -- continued
Categories General Specific
Descriptors Descriptors
Socioeconani..c - Energy needs
oontinued Regional ecoron:ics
Historical/archaeo-
logical sites
Aesthetics
SOURCE: Office of the Chief of Engineers, Final Supplement
to the Final Environmental Impact Statement; HRECots Portsmouth
Refinery and Terminal, Portsmouth, Virginia, December, 1978, Wash-
inton D.C. pp. 1-9
Of the 69 sites. 19 were selected to.be considered in more detail. 97
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The results, as interpreted by NOAA and DOl, indicated that
Hampton Roads was the l~ast environmentally acceptable of
the 19 sites.
While the conclusions of the task force indicated that
Hampton Roads was a poor site from an environmental point
of view, there was no agreement on a remedial course of
action. HREC insisted no alternative site was feasible and
furthermore, that no studies had been conducted to docu-
ment possible adverse state or local socio-economic consi-
derations that would render these sites infeasible for
f ' t' 98 h h're 1nery construe 1on. T e consensus among t e OppOS1-
tion, however, was that the task force conclusions should
have been the final factor which would persuade the Army
to deny the permit on grounds of environmental consideration.
A NMFS report best summed up the opinions of the dissenters
"NMFS recog;}.izes the need for petroluem modernization and
expansion but such industrial complexes should not be located
I
within the confines of a productive and fragile estuarine
environment. ,,99
Summary of the Conflict
While all parties found support for their arguments in
the Corps' public interest policies, the conclusions drawn
were completely divergent. The proponents of the refinery
based their case on national need issues, local economic
benefits to the city of Portsmouth and the State, and pollu-
tion control technology. The opponents, on the other hand,
-.-'
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questioned the real national need for the complex and the
validity of local benefit calculations. Furthermore, they
contended that natural resource values, oil spi.ll frequency
and toxicity studies were underestimated and therefore,
the respective pUblic interest factors could not be adequately
repr·!!sented.
Henc:e, the aampton Roads refinery pzoj e.ct; posed a
very difficult permitting case for the Corps. Faced with
conflicting public interest factors, the Corps first, had
to initiate an intricate weighing process to determine if
the benefits of the proposed complex reasonably balanced
against the forseeable detriments; and second, to grant or
deny' ·the permits based on the outcome of this balancing
process.
Decision Rationale
The major factors of public interl~st considered by
the Corps in the Hampton Roads case are listed below. A
brief discussion of the Corps' decision making rationale
accompanies each public interest factor.
Public Interest Factors
Wetlands
While the wetlands on the site are considered impor-
tant by the Army, the revised application submitted by HREC
would avoid construction in wetlands along tidal creeks
adjacent to the tributaries. Although 8 acres may be
--
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affected by reducti.on in fresh water flow due to alteration
of drainage patterns during constructioni the Army deter-
mined that this was an acceptable impact.I OO
Landuse, Aesthetics, and Recreation
The HREC site is zoned for industrial use. Accord-
ingly, the1\rmy assumed the refinery would be compatible with
current land use plans. The FElS states that occasional
flares from the refinery would cause unpleasant odors a~d
moderate discomfort during periods of ai~ inversion, however,
rapid dissipation is expected. No significant impairment
to recreational boating appears probable. I OI
Water Supply
Due to the steadily decreasing aquifer, the Virginia
State Water Control Board (SWCB) has declared the South Hamp-
ton Roads region a "ground water management area". The City
of Portsmouth, located in this region, obtains 20 percent of
its water supply from ground water sources. Many believe
that the new refinery, which will require two million gallons
of potable water per day, will only exacerbate the area's
chronic water problems. The Portsmouth City manager, however,
testified that the City's water system had a sufficient yield
to satisfy demand including HREC's through the year 2000.
Furthermore, the city offered to use water from surface im-
poundments in order to meet the refinery's need. 10 2
Although the Corps expressed some concern over the
adequacy of the water supply, it declined to consider it a
factor of pUblic interest. The Corps determined that federal
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review was inappropriate since the city of Portsmouth has
full jurisdiction over its water supply.
Water· Qua·lity
The Virginia SWCB is responsible for ensuring that
permit applications are in compliance with applicable effluent
limit~tions, water quality standards, and required manaqe-
~ent practices. EPA, however, retains authority under the
FWPCA to veto permits which are not in compliance with the
guidelines and requirements of the Act.
The Board issued to HREC the NPDES permit for the
refinery and set limits on the amount of wastewater effluent
that the refinery may legally discharge into the Elizabeth
River. EPA declined to veto the permit indicating to the
Corps that possible degradation of water quality was an
bl . k 103accepta e r 1.5 •
Dredging
Although dredging would permanently destroy 37 acres
of productive shallow water habitat', the impacts to viota
from increased turbidity, resuspension of heavy metals and
higher biological oxygen demand would be shortlived. Both
the SWCP and the Virginia Marine Resources Commission (VMRC)
issued the State dredging permits with the provision that
the refinery proposal incorporated the following stipulations:
1. installation of an adequate spill containment
system commensurate with the best state-of-the-art
equipment,
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2. prohibition of dredging during months corres-
ponding with spawning and larval development,
3. compliance by the permitee with all water
quality standards established by the SWCB and
all other laws affecting the project and
effluent. I 04
The Corps also reviewed the dredging proposal from its
traditional area of expertise, navigation. The subsequent
evaluation revealed that navigation would not be hindered by
construction and operation of the proposed refinery. Since
the appropriate state permits had been granted, the Corps
concluded that the dredging action itself would not be
contrary to the public interest.
Air Quality and Health
Although the Hampton Roads area alrea~y exhibits
poor air quality, the State Air Pollution Con~rol Board
(SAPCB) found that operation of the facility ~ould not vio-
late National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) provided
that an emission offset was developed. Offsets are part of
the Virginia state air quality plan required by the Clean
Air Act. The Virginia SAPCB is required to develop and adopt
a state implementation plan (SIP) setting forth the necessary
control efforts to achieve compliance with the NAAQS.I05
The plan prohibits new major stationary sources or modifi-
cation of sources in regions of a state which are not in
compliance with these national standards. However, offsets -
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emission reductions that would not otherwise be required -
can be used to allow industrial development in areas of non-
compliance. 10 6 Offsets oblige potential industry to make
additional~ommitments to pollution control so that the net
effect from the ap?roval of a new source will not increase
11 . 107po utLon.
In the case of the Hampton Roads area, the off~et
entailed reducing hydrocarbon emissions. The tradeo££ ~e-
quires the Virginia Department of Highways and Transportation
to change from oil-based asphalt to water-based asphalt in
the eastern half of the State. lOB
The offset plan was submitted to EPA and eventually
received approval indicating to the Corps that health
considerations were satisfied at both the Federal and State
levels.
Fish and Wildlife
The impacts discussed thus far were found by the Corps
to be within the parameters of Federal, state and local
requirements. However, determining whether ornot the im-
pacts to fis~ and wildlife resources were within these para-
I
meters proved to be much m()re difficult. In particular,
the Corps had difficulty in evaluating impacts from oil spills.
AccordinglYr the staff examined the issue of oil spill
probability and oil tcxicity caref~lly before addressing
fish and wildlife impacts.
Oil Spill Analysis
The Corps determined that impacts resulting from
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chronic spillage during oil transfer operations would be
negligable. This conclusion was based on the expected success
of pollution control equipment employed at the refinery.
The Corps, however, acknowledged that major spills could
cause substantial damage to important commercial and recre-
ational fishing operations and decided to evaluate the
probabilities of such a spill. The resultant:. document did
not attempt to generate new probability statistics but in-
stead, consolidated the existing information in this area
pertaining to the Hampton Roads refinery.
The document was highly critical of the ECO report
and disputed many of the basic assumptions. The Corps found
fault with ECOts use of statistical data and failure to
account for new pollution prevention legislation, regula-
tions and technology in its probability anaylsis. In
response to the ECO report, the Corps concluded the following:
Major oil spill probabilities ranging from I
in 50 years to 1 in 335 years are presented.
They (ECO) use historical, worldwide, U.S.-wide
or localized data bases. The data base will
affect the probability. For example, if we use
Hampton Roads historical data, then the pro-
bability for a major oil spill would be zero.
Furthermore, probabilities using historical
data bases are not reliable. Probabilities must
reflect site specific conditions and future
technology, regulation, legislation, etc. How-
ever, the methodology does not exist to consider
all these factors and to arrive at a reasonable
probability. We believe that the probability
presented in the ECO report, I major spill every
50 years is too high and the probability of I in
335 years is too low. We further recognize that
no prediction of the probability of a major spill
is reliable.
The oil spill probability statistics used by the
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Corps and confidence in the Coast Guard's ability to prevent
or control pollution incidents influenced the Army's ul-
timate decision to grant permits. Under the Ports and Water-
ways Safe.ty Act, the Coast Guard Captain of the Port is given
broad authority to establish vessel traffic systems, control
vessels in the nation's ports and waters and to otherwide
improve the safety of marine transport in order to reduce
th 'b'l't f 11' "'d t 110 Te poss~ 1 1 Y 0 po ut10n caus1ng 1nC1 en s. 0
curtail oil spill damage, the Coast Guard has implemented a
sophisticated Pollution Information Reporting System capable
of providing on request summary and specific information such
as cause, size and location of all spills in .U .. S.• Waters.
On this basis the Army assumed that the pollution prevention
and control techniques carried out by the Coast Guard
would reduce the risks of oil spills and their impacts to·
an acceptable level. Furthermore, based on a worst case
situation, a major oil spill in the vicinity of the oyster
beds, the Corps data indicated that impacts would not be
, 'bl III1rreverS1 e.
Oil Spill Impacts
The Corps addressed oil impacts in its Washington
level evaluation. While the report acknowledged the potential
adverse effects, it disagreed with NMFE, FWS and VIMS data
on toxicity levels. In drawing conclusions, the Corps relied
heavily on a study presented at a Conference on Prevention
and Control of Oil. The conference study indicated that
oysters were much more resilliant to the effects of oil
7'6
d h dat d' th .. d i t d 112compoun stan ana use Dy 0 er aqencz.es an a.ca e .
The Corps rejected a newly pUblicized report concern-
ing oil toxicity studies. The report presented evidence that
much smaller amounts than previously determined could be
lethal to oysters. The study concluded that a relatively
mi.noz oil spill, approxin.ately 1,000 barrels could harm
Delaware Bay oysters.
The zeporc was submitted to the sec.recary of the Army,
Clifford Alexande~ by the Interior Secretary, Cecil Andrus
in a final effort to prevent approval of the $600 million
refinery project. The 1967 MOU reuqired Alexander to review
the document before finalizing his decision to grant the
permits. While Alexander did not dispute the validity of
the study, he determined that the findings were not appli-
cable to the Hampton Roads situation. His conclusion was
based on the differences between the two environments, the
Chesapeake and Delaware Bays and the questionable applica-
bility of the test conditions to the Hampton Roads situation. 1 13
Furthermore, the Corps did not view t.he oil refinery
as an operation which wou Id automatically curtail the viability
of important bay fisheries. While oil spills could cause
some damage to fisheries, the extent would range from minor
to severe depending on the conditions. This damage, however,
is not necessarily irreversible especially i:!1 the cases of
non catastrophi.c spills. The Corps also poLnt.ed out that the
threat of a major spill is not a new hazard. Crude oil and
refined products are presently transitting the area.
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The Corps therefore decided that the fisheries and refinery
e t t 11 1 · 114w re no mu ua y exc US1ve •
. Na·tional Benefits
supporters and opponents disagreed over the refinery's
potential contribution to national security, the balance of
payments and the costs of refined petrolewn products for
East Coast consumers. The Corps Examined both sides of the
argument and conclude~ that while some national benefits
could result from the project, there was no absolute national
d f h d f " 115nee or t e propose re 1nery.
The Corps acknowledged that storage capacity at the
refinery could contribute to national security by adding
stocks to the Strategic Petrolewn Reserve and it would also
reduce import of refined product from foreign sources. How-
ever, the overall impact to national security, although posi-
tive, would be tiny, and denial of the refinery permits
ld d th 1 1 f . 1 . t 116wou not re uce e current eve 0 nat10na secur1 y.
The Corps warned against discussing the refinery's benefits
in terms of balance-of-payments explaining:
Over the long run, with or without the refinery,
the nation~s international payments will roughly
balance .••• If the benefits of the refinery to the
nation do not exceed its costs, it should not be
undertaken simply because it Wilt reduce the flow
of dollars into foreign hands.
Furthermore, the Corps questioned DOE'S statements
concerning the need for new refineries. While DOE made a
persuasive qualitative case for additional East Coast
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refinery capacity, the Corps claimed that the Department
by no means established that the United States
economy would be crippled in any fundamental sense
without additional East Coast refineries~ and there-
fore, it has not demonstrated that there is any
absolute need for such capacity.11S
Regarding local need, the Corps, recognized that some
economic banefits, principally in the form of tax dollars,
would result from the refinery. However, the FEIS and its
supplement presented no evidence that unemployment in either
the construction industry or the Portsmouth area would be
reduced by the proposed refinery. There was no basis for
the claim, the Corps concluded, that jobs created by t~e
construction and operation of the refinery would constitute
t " 1 b f" 119a na 10na ene 1t.
Recognizing that there was neither an absolute need,
nor quantitative evaluation of the potential national benefits
and costs, the Department of Army developed National Economic
Development (NED) estimates to determine some of the bene-
fits and costs of the p~oposed refinery. The NED evaluation
was designed to provide a limited appraisal of the economic
benefits for the refinery from a national perspective.
Measured benefits were defined as the difference in total
transportation costs for refined petroleum products sold
on the East Coast with or without the proposed refinery.
Measured costs were defined as the difference in total costs
of oil spills in United States waters with or without the
proposed refinery. Based on the NED analysis the Corps
concluded that the economic benefits to the nation would
outweigh": th.e costs of non catastrophic oil spills. The
report, however, pointed out that economic benefits accruing
from the refinery would be forgone if a large catastrophic
"I "11' 12001 SP1 were to occur 1n the lo~er Chesapeake Bay area.
After initially reviewing the case, the Chief of
Engineers decided that additional information on alternative
sitE locations was necessary to reach a decision on the permit
and to comply with NEPA. While the results of the study
indicated that environmentally more acceptable sites exist,
NEP~"does not mandate that the most environmentally superior
site is chosen. Rather NEPA requires that alternatives are
sufficiently considered to permit a reasoned choice. Con-
sequently, the purpose of the project was to Pfovide additiona~
information which could be useful in evaluatin~r alternatives
to the Portsmouth site. The aim was to provid.e the Corps
with the in~or.mation necessary to determine whether or not
to grant the Hampton Roads permits.
Surunary
The controversial Hampton Roads project presented the
Corps with an extremely difficult public interest decision.
Both sides had pUblic interest factors in their favor to
buttress th~ir argmnents. Both enjoyed support from vocal
and emotional consti tuenciE!s.
In the final evaluation, the Chief of the Engineers
BD
concluded:
I have examined the entire case and concluded that
the issuance of the permit with the attached condi-
tions is in the pUblic interest. I've carefully
considered and weighed the factors of the public
interest and found trlat the benefits of the proposal
outweigh the adverse impacts. I particularly note
that the beneficial results are certain while the
adverse environmental are mostly speculative with
regard to occurance ~nd degree of damage. Also, the
probability of occurance of most adverse impacts
can be reduced by enforcements of applicable laws
and regulations, appropriate permit conditions and
application of modern technology.12l
After much deliberation, the Secretary of the Army
concurred with this determination. In a summary statement,
he cited the following reasons as key determinants for his
de~ision.
1. The refinery and marine terminal
construction should meet the highest state-of-the-
art standards for safety, efficiency, and environ-
mental safeguards.
2. All State permits for the facility
have been issued, .•• attesting to its compatibility
with air and water quality standards.
3. Construc~ion of an oil refinery in
Portsmouth, Virginia, would not violate any known
national policy or law.
4. The refinery would be consistent with
national energy goals, specifically, it will be
capable of producing low sulfur fuels and unleaded
gasoline from sour crude feedstock e .
5. The Virginia State and local govern-
ments support construction of the refinery.
6. The proposed location, while not poten-
tially the most environmentally superior site, is
not the most environmentally damaging site; and,
when viewed in its entirety, is one of the best
locations on the east coast for a refinery and
terminal complex.
7. The economic benefits to the Nation
from the refinery would outweigh the costs of non-
catastrophic oil spills that could potentially
impact the Hampton Roads area.
B. The potential for oil s~i~l~ (b~sed
on statistical probabilities) would d~m~n~~h ~n
the upper Chesapeake Bay area with the ref~nery.
.--.,..
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9. We believe that the highly valuable
crab and oyster resources would not be totally de-
stroyed, even if a large, uncontained oil spill
were to occur.
10. The channel size and botton charac-
teristics of the port, •••mitigate against the
probability of a major pollution-causing accident
occurring in the harbor area.
11.· The econo~ic benefits which could
accrue from the refinery would be foregone if
a large catastrophic oil spill were to occur in
the lower Chesapeake Bay area. This is the gut
. issue on which the decision to grant or deny hinges.
Is the low probability of risk which could
potentially seriously impact a high quality resource
worth taking given the otherwise certain and sub-
stantial national benefit which would accrue from
construction and operation of a refinery in
Portsmouth, Virginia?122
Secretary Alexander concluded that the risk was worth taking.
As demonstrated in this chapter, the correct public
interest decision in the Hampton Roads case was far from
obvious. The lengthy evaluation prior to the final determin-
ation supports this conclusion. Although in the last analysis,
the Corps determined that the public interest would best
be served by granting the permits, the opposition presented
very convincing evidence to the contrary. Further infor-
mation is, therefore, necessary to fully evaluate corps'
decision. The following discussion will focus on the
adequacy with which the Corps implemented the public interest
program in the Hampton Roads project, problems in the
pUblic interest program and suggestions for change.
CHAPTER V
DISCUSSION
Implementation Adequacy
Compliance with Regulation
The Corps complied with all legislative requirements
pertaining to the Hampton Roads case. Pursuant to the FWCA
and MOU, the Corps consulted with the Department of Interior
throughout the history of the project. In fact, the Secre-
tary of the Army delayed his official determination until
the Secretary of Interior could register his final comments.
NEPA requirements were fulfilled when the Corps filed
an environmental i~pact statement for the proposal. Although
the statement was found to inadequately address alternatives,
the Corps remedied this problem by conducting a separate
alternative study.
The require~ents of the FWPCA and CAA were also upheld.
The Corps evaluated the probable impacts resulting from the
section 404 dredge and fil~_ permit and determined that little
permanent damage would occur. In yarticular, no wetlands
would be destroyed and drec'.ge material disposal posed no pro-
blems. Regarding the CAA, the Cor2s made sure its permit
issuance did not hinder the' implementation of the Act's provi-
sions. Accordingly, when the Army permits were granted, their
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issuance remained contingent upon EPA approval of the
Virginia offset program.
Furthermore, the Corps fulfilled all the public inter-
est review requirements. It specifically addressed each factor
listed in the regulations and gave special emphasis to those
most important in the Hampton Roads project. After applying
the four public review criteria, the Corps determined the
following:
1. The relative extent of the public and private need
for the proposed structure;
As to the demand for refinery output, we kno~ that
the East Coast demand for product far exceeds
its refinery capacity. Certainly,a source of
supply closer to the market is more cost - and
energy - effective. As for the future trends in
crude receipts and refined product demand, issues
concerning the acceptability of reliance on
specific foreign sources and for what amounts
of oil, are matters to be decided outside the
scope of the Army permit process. We know
that there is insufficient u.s. refinery capacity
to process sour crude feedstock and produce
low sulfur fuels and unleaded gitsoline.123
2. The desirabili.ty of using appropriate alternative
locations and methods to aCGomplif:1h the objective of
the proposed ~tructure or work;
NEPA does not require that the least environ-
mentally damaging location be adopted for the proposed
project. It requ i res only t.hat reasonable alternatives
are examined and that information gained from the study
will help determine whether or not the selected site is
suitable for the project. After reviewing the special
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alternative site study, the Secretary of the Army
concluded;
I am convinced that only four of the alternative
sites explored .• ~compare favorably to the
Portsmouth site when considering the relevant
factors in toto; that none of these four is,
however, clearly preferable to the Portsmouth
site •••• 124
3. The extent and permanence of the bene f Lo La I and/or
detrimental effects which the proposed structure or
work may have on the public and private user to which
the area is suited;
The Corps evaluation indicated that chronic
spills associated with routine oil transfer operations
or other accidental refinery discharges would not in-
crease in the Bay due to th6 terminal's pollution
control equipment. Catastrophic spills, although con-
sidered to be highly improbable could potentially im-
pact the James River oyster grounds but the Corps
believed that the ov~rall effect would not destroy the
b d 125e s.
4. The probable impact ~f each proposal in relation to
the cwmnulative effe,:t created by existing and anti-
cipated structures of work in the area;
In response to this criterion, the Corps offered
the following comment:
We believe that oil spills will increase
in the Hampton Roads and lower Chesapeake
Bay areas because of the increased traffic but
will decrease in the Upper Bay area due to the
replacement of product tankers with barge
\,......
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With regard to tl~is last statement, it should be
noted that U. S. Coast Guard data overwhelmingly refutes the
premise that barges have lower s?ill probabilities than
ta:lkers. In fact, tank barges i:l general have a much higher
accident rate than tankels of similar capacity.127
While disagreement with the Corps' pUblic interest
determination and evaluation methodologies may be valid,
nevertheless, the Corps complied with all legislative and
regulatory requirements. Furthermore, its decision making
rationale appears to be consistent with past cases and can
be supported by them.
Relation to Past Cases
A brief comparison of Zabel v. Tabb, Marco Island
and the Block "M" cases to the Hampton Roads refinery
project reveal a number of striking similarities. In all
cases, protection of natural resource values was a major
issue. The public interest regul9tions along with the Fish
and Wildlife Coordination Act, and the Federal Water Pollu-
tion Control Act were fundamental in each of the four
decision making processes. However, resource values in the first
three cases constituted sufficient national pUblic interest
to warrant permit denial, while energy development was
deemed to be of greater importance in the Hampton Roads
case.
The seemingly opposite determinations raise questions
'-
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concerning the Corps' consistency in applying the pUblic
interest review. A closer comparison of the four cases,
however, reveals substantive differences between the former
and latter.
Chapter III, The Historical Evaluation of Corps'
Acti.vity in the Coastal Zone, reve:aled that wetlands pro-
tect.ion is accorded special public interest consideration.
In conformance with this emerging policy, the Corps altered
its regulations to state that wetlands are;
••• environmentally vital areas. They constitute a
productive and valuable public resource, the un-
necessary alteration or destru~tion of which
should be discouraged as contrary to the public
interest. 128
Consequently, projects calling for wetlands alteration are
closely scrutinized by the Corps.
The Zabel v. Tabb, Marco Inland and Block "M" cases
required substantial wetlands destruction. The applicants
did not successfully demonstrate th~t their proposals were
of greater national importance than the protection of wet-
lands. Hence, all three conflicted with Corps national
public interest policy.
Furthermore, each proposal required wetlands alter-
ation to accomodate some form of waterfront recreational
housing. The Corps concluded that such development was not
water dependent and therefore did not warrant wetlands
alteration. Similar development could be located slightly
inland, provide the same function, and afford easy access
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to the water without widespread wetlands destruction.
Accordingly, the Corps determined that the pUblic interest
would best be served by p~rmit denial.
In contrast to the above cases, the Hampton Roads
refinery and marine terminal called for no wetlands alter-
ation. Consequently, the project did not come in direct
conflict with the specific public interest requirement,
wetlands protection. The impacts to national resources were
much less certain in the Hampton Roads example. Most
of the concern for fisheries and water quality protection
was related to the possibility of impacts from increased
tanker and barge operations. Not only was the frequency
and 'degree of damage resulting from these operations highly
speculative, but such impacts were secondary to the project.
Furthermore, the proposal's primary or direct impacts
were not considered sufficient enough to warrant denial
based on national factors ~f public interest.
The Hampton Roads ~efinery also differs from the
previous cases with respect to locational requirements and
applicable public interest factors. Unlike the housing
proposals, a marine terminal is a water dependent facility.
The HREC site, which allows easy tanker and barge access,
is physically well suited to the terminal's purpose.
Furthermore the refinery is in accordance with at least
one stated public interest factor, energy development.
Due to the shifting political focus of the U.S. since 1973
from conservation and environmental issues to solving the
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nation's energy problems, this particular factor of public
interest has gained dramatically in importance.
Finally, the HREC refinery has received support
from both the state permitting agencies and the Governor
of Virginia. While the Corps could deny the permits
contrary to the staters position, in the absence of over-
riding national factors of pUblic interest, the regu-
lations specify that the permits should be issued following
the receipt of a favorable state determination. 13 0
Table 7 illustrates the aforementioned comparisons.
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( f TABLE 5
eatpariSQ'l of 'lbree Cases with the HREX: ~finery
(
eatparisCll Zabel v : Tabb I Maroo Island "BlOCk: .•;r.1'; HRElC
Factors
Action Dredge aOO. fill Dredge am fill Dredge am' fill Dredge and fill
Wetlands loss 11 acres 2100 acres 12 acres o acres
Proposal Trailer Park Resort housing Ccndaninium Oil rsfineJ:y and
marine teDninal
water dependent No No No Yes
Federal agency FWS recarmended FWS, NMFS, EPA NM£o'S, FWS recan- NMFS, FWS recan-
positims denial recarmended denial nended denial. nended denial.
U•S. Deparb'lent EPA reculilended
of Labor reccmnended denial rot grant-
approval ed own pennits
State agency Florida GaIle aOO. Florida Game and Florida Gane aOO. VMR:, V&ltCB,
positicns Freshwater Fish Freshwater Fish Freshwater Fish SAPCB granted
camrission reccm- Camri.ssion recan- Camri.ssion recan- pennits
rrended denial nended denial neOOed denial
i
Q)
\D
( (
TABLE 7 - continued
Carparison of 'Ibree cases with the HROC Ref:in&y
(
carparison Zabel v. Tabb Marco Islam Block "M" HROC
Factors
<:;overnor ~denial Recamerrled approval ReccmreIiJed denial Recxlluended
approval
Present envi- Urrleveloped sane devetoprent Urrlevel~ Highly
ror.m:mt developed
CoL~ Jecl::>.i.un Deny Deny with limited Deny Approve
approval
'\0
o
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The preceding discussion indicates that the Hampton
Roads decision is not only consistent with past cases but
is conqxuous with the public interest energy policy.
The Corps also complied with all mandatory regulations and
legislation. Hence, in the case of the Hampton Roads re-
finery, the Corps appears t:> have properly Lmp Lemerrced the
public interest program.
But while the final determination is justifiable
in a strict sense, it does not imply that the pUblic
interest decision making process is problem free. It is
by no means a fail safe mechanism which automatically
ensures that good projects are promoted and bad ones squelched.
The 'broad mandate, complex balancing process, e.Lonq with
other evaluation components makes public interest decision
making sUbject to dispute while often procedurally correct.
The following discussion will delineate some of the problems
specific to the public interest review which were revealed
during the course of this study.
Perceived and Real Problems in the Program
Evaluation of the Mandate
An assessment of the Corps' program necessarily begins
with an inquiry into the concept of pUblic interest. Political
scientist Glendon Schubert divides the contemporary theories
of pUblic interest into three groups; idealist, rationalist and
realist.
The idealist theory holds that the true public in-
terest rests in the higher, natural law which is separate
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from the administrative process. The administrator must resist
all political influence and impose on the people what is good
for them whether they want the program or not. 132 Regarding
questions of coastal utilization, those adhering to this
theory argue that natural law is the law of nature and there-
fore is higher. Accordingly, most coastal alteration is con-
sidered to be in ~iolation of the public interest.
The rationalist theory reflects the idealist notion
that the pUblic interest is something separate from and inde-
pendent of private interests. Instead, rationalists contend
that there exists a common good that reflects the prescmed
existence of various common interests. The decision maker is
the·refore charged with faithfully implementing that popular
will. l 33 However, often there is no clearly defined "common
good" or "popular will" that the Corps can follows. In many
cases, "public interest groups" such as environmental, civil
rights and energy development may be odds wit~ each other.
Hence, the Corps is not faced with a pop~lar will to execute,
but with ar. intense conflict of interests among its various
"publics" with regard to how the coast should be used. l 34
Realist theorists reject the postulations of both
the idealist and rationalist adherents. Instead, they
lower expectations regarding what the Corps' procedures are
expected to accomplish. Although they, like the rationalist,
recognize that the pUblic interest is a collection of special
or selfish interes~s they reject the notion that the adminis-
trative process has the capacity to calculate the best, so-
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cially preferred or most efficient use of resources. Decision
makers therefore function as conflict mediators respecting the
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use of rescurces. Rather than calculating or attempting
to represent the pUblic interest, the decision maker simply
becomes the mediator.
As th~s discussion indicates the public interest
review, with its broad, all encompassing mandate, is impossible
to define. In fact, the very concept of public interest varies
from case to case, depending upon the socio-economic para-
meters at the state, local and national levels. While such a
mandate enables the Corps to be sensitive to the needs of a
changiBg society, neither the Corps nor the populace are
able to arrive at a public interest consensus, much less
determine the appropriate direction the 'public interest
review should take.
The lack of program direction has led "public
interest" g:;:-oups to define the Corps' program to be congruous
with their particular ideology. Those supporting environ-
mental initiatives have viewed the pUblic interest provisions
to be synonomous with conservation and preservation directives.
According to regulations, however, the public interest covers
the entire gamut of issues. It is not intended that the Corps
should advocate anyone particular factor.
Besides presentin9 definitional problems, the broad
mandate leads to other difficulties as well. The mandate
directS:. the Corps to consider and balance all factors
relevant to a given proposal. Provided that the Corps
examines each factor and complies with other regulatory re-
quirements nearly any decision the Agency makes will be le-
gally justifyable. Consequently, execution of the public
interest mandate could be reduced to a procedural exercise
merely providing a mechanism for the justification of both
good and bad decisions.
E17.a:~uation of the Decision Making Process
The troubles inherent in the Corps' pUblic interest
mandate also impact the decision making process. Becau$e
the broad directive requires the Corps to evaluate and
balance a plethora of factors unique to each case, specific
implementation guidelines are unable to provide the organi-
zation with the flexibility necessary to carry out its ambi-
tious program. The Corps, therefore, has no implementation
framework.
Critics have suggested that quan~itative analysis
would enhance the program's reliability by providing an
impl~~entation framework. They contend that traditional
cost/benefit studies, employed in the Corp's civil works
programs shculd become the guidelines for the pUblic interest
review. HO\\lever, upon close examination, cost/benefit anal-
ysis is not invulnerable to outside criticism or to differing
calculations. Disagreement among experts is common. Much
depends upon who does the calculati.ons and which factors are
" f' d h" h t 136 C t/b f'tconsidered as bene ~ts an w 1C as cos s. os ene 1
analysis is also unsuitable for public interest review because
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it neglects or underestimates many factors including environ-
menta~ intangibles such as aesthetics. Consequently, a
decision based soley on cost/benefit studies will often be
an inadequate indicator of the public interest. For these
reasons, the Corps has only utilized cost/benefit analysis
f bl . . t t d .. k . 1 . . t db' 137or pu' 1C 1neres eC1S10n rna 1ng on a 1m1 e aS1S.
Lacking implementation guidance, the Corps executes
the program in the fashion 'advocated .by proponents of the'
realist ·theory. The Corps functions as a mediator or clear-
inghouse for pUblic and agency comment. The actual review
procedure supports this observation.
corps' regulations direct the District Engineers
to consider and weigh conservation, economics, aesthetics,
history, navigation, water quality and environmental values.
Because of the inherent difficulties in attempting to reflect
these values within a single organization, the Corps circulates
permit appLi.cat.Lons among various other concerned federal,
state and local agencies as well as interest groups. Various
reviewers examine the permit request from different perspec-
tives and accordingly, different emphases:. local governments-
land use; state natura~ resource agencies - water quality and
wetlands protection; st:ate economic development agencies -
port development; u.s. FWS - fish and wildlife values; the
EPA - environmental protection; and citizen groups - special
. t 1381nteres 5.
This procedure! has been criticized as ad hoc or
haphazard and in any event, unable to reflect the public
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interest factors. However,b¥. injecting a healthy eclecti-
cism into the review process, the above procedure is
a major strength in a regulatory program which lacks for-
mal implementation guidelines.
The concesuions arrived at in the Hampton Roads
exanlple demonstrat~ the program's strength. ~hese concessions
took the form of a state-of-the-art oil spill containment
system, dredging requirements to mitigat~ impacts to natural
resources, and the sewage treatment plan previously discussed.
Each was incorporated into the proposal as a result of the
pUblic interest review indicating that the oppositions concerns
did not go unheeded. Instead, the decision making process
resulted in a compromise, which pursuant to the public in-
terest review and pertinent legislation discussed, would
miti.gate fish and \'Tildlife impacts and simultaneously allow
for energy development.
Evaluation of Factors Outside
the Jurisdiction of the Corps
The adequacy of pUblic interest dete~inations may
be affected when permits for a project are also required
from state, local or other federal agencies. Theoretically,
these agencies have regulatory requirements which ensure that
impacts within their pervue will be properly evaluated. How-
ever, in some instances, the parameters directing the regu-
latory programs of these agencies may be too restrictive pre-
venting them from executing decisions in accordance with
their mandate. In this case, agencies may rely on the Corps
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pUblic interest review to rectify the inadequacies of their
own permi t p~ograms.
EPA encountered this dilemma in the Hampton Roads
refinery proposal. In this example, HREC complied with all
the regulato~y requirements within the limits of EPA's juris-
diction. consequent.Ly , against its own best interests, EPA
granted the appropriate permits (see pp. 73-4). Unable to
halt the project at its level of review, EPA sought to prevent
the proposal through the Corps' public interest review and
therefore urged the Corps to deny the dredge and fill permits.
Furthermore, state, local and federal agencies vul-
nerable to political pressure may purposefully shun their
permit responsibilities. Well aware of the second level of
review conducted by the Corps, these agencies may perform
Lnadequat.e permf, t analysis and depend upon t.he Corps to
remedy their poor, politically motivated decisions.
Unfortunatelly, the Corps can not use its pUblic
interest review to evaluate the decision making processes of
other agencies. Consideration of such factors are beyond
the jurisdiction of the Corps. Instead, the Corps must rely
on the integ~ity of the state, local or federal agency deci-
sion making and assume that permits granted by these agencies
indicate the acceptability of potential impacts. If, however,
other permit agencies are unable Qr unwilling to take the
consequences of unpopular decisions, the effectiveness of
the pUblic interest review will be reduced.
98
The role of scientific information in decision
making processes can also have an effect on the public
interest review. This is particularly true when the infor-
mation is used to evaluate secondary and cummulative impacts.
The Corps received extensive comments concerning
its evaluation of secondary and cumulative impacts to shell-
fish in the Hampton Roads, water related recreational oppor-
tunity in the lower Chesapeake Bay and in genE'ral the quality
of human life in the region. NOAA, DOl, local shellfisher-
men alliances, and public interest groups acc~sed the Corps
of significantly underestimating these impacts as well as
the probability of impact occurance. Accordin.gly, they con-
cluded that the public interest determination was biased.
Comparative oil spill incidents were sited by these organ-
izations substantiating their clai~s. Ad~iti~nally, VIMS
and other reputable scientific institutions produced reports
which indicate thai: impacts may be greater than the Corps
anti.cipated"
However, accident rate pr::>babilities do not provide
a sound basis from which to estimate secondary and cumulative
impacts. Present t.eohnoLoqy does no t; allow forcasting pro-
bable future effects with total certainty. Hence the analyst
or decision maker must rely not only on current professional
techniques but reasonable judgemen"t. The data used by the
Corps and its own staff ev~luations indicates that impacts
and probabilities would be less substantial than was
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expressed by the opposition.
In light of scientific di.screpancies, one can question
the adequacy with which the Corps evaluated potential impacts
to the resources of the Bay and the quality of human life.
Howevsr, no discussion can unambiguously address this issue
for a numbe~ of reas~ns.
Science is ~uch less impartial than public opinion
seems will~lg to admit. Whether the issue is oil impacts
or wetlands productivity, there are several factors at work
in the translation of scientific information into natural
1 , h i h 1 b' .. 139resource po ~cy w 1C prevents tota 0 Ject1v1ty.
First, the best contemporary scientific understandins
..
of natural phenomena may turn out, in the light of later
research, to have been in error. Consequently, decisions
may be made based in whole or in part on s::::ientific opinion
whose validity may not stand up over time.
Second, whenever the sUbject mattFr is a topic of
political debate, science becomes politicized to some extent
despite the myth that science is apolitical. The mixing
of political values and scientific data. may come about within
the discipline or through the translation of scientific
into pUblic information. The scientist who enters into the
public controversy himself often fails to realize the way
in which scientific percept.Lons color his perspective
toward the issues involved.
Indeed, science assumed a controversial role in the
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Hampton Roads decision making process. The best contemporary
scientific understanding of oil spill impacts, at the time
of the decision, demonstrated no concurrence regarding degree
and longetivity of effect. Instead two conflicting perspec-
tives concerning impacts and impact probability were supported
by various individuals and organizations within the political
realm. Inevitably the scientific information which formed
the basis for the Corps' d=cision was not value free. Given
that decisions are not value free, the problem of determining
at which point subjectivity becomes detrimental still exists.
In summary, the following potential problems exist
in the public interest review program:
1. The broad mandate makes it impossible to define the
public interest. This in turn, can confuse the
public's perception of the program's purpose. It
also encourages a procedu~al rather than substantive
ap:?roach.
2. The decision making process lacks implementation
guidelines which therefore leaves final determina-
tions sUbject to the political,environment.
3. Agencies with permit responsibilities in conjuction
with the Corps may not be willing or able to' make
sound decisions.
4. Scientific information is not value free and conse-
querrt.Ly does not demonstrate agreement concerning
the extent of secondary and cummulative impacts.
--
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SusgE!stions for Change
Some concerned that envircnmental values were under-
estimated in the Hampton Roads decision making process have
suggested that EPA or state environmental agencies should
administer the pUblic interest program. The Corps would
therefore be r.elieved of its public interest responsibilities
and could refocus i t.s attention to navigational ~nd civil
works programs.
However, program transferral may prove to be an
unsound proposal. EPA, at present, lacks the expertise and
capacity to take over the enormous task of regulating coastal
and wetlands alterations. Conversely, the Corps has had
years of experience in this constantly evolving field. Im-
mediate transferral of this expertise and experience to EPA
would be impossible. ~urthermore, it is questio~able whether
or not an environmental advocacy agency should regulate all
development activities in the coastal zone. Since the pUblic
interest mandate encompasses more than environmental values,
proper recognition must be given to these factors or the
program's mandate will be violated. Metamorphis of the gen-
eral public interest rE!view into an envaronment.e l, program
could diminish popular and congressional support.
State control of the expanded sections 10 and 404
permit programs would pe disastrous at this time. States
lack the finances nece$sary to implement these program(and
unless the federal government is forthcoming with such funds,
it is highly unlikely that states would assume administrative
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responsiblility. Few, if any states have developed the
infrastructure necessary to administer a program as ambitious
as the public interest review. Finally, states, particularly
those without an approved coastal zone management plan often
lacki.meohanisms to,incor.p.oratenational faotors of pUblic'
interest: into their.' deoision: making process.· Without such
mechanisms, st·ate agencies. will· have difficulty extracting,
themselves'from,local' and'state pressures in order to make
public' interest determinations.·
In'summary~, no·sin91e agency has either the exper~
tise oz.: procedures neceasary to' consider the diffuse' and
sometimes: conflictinq "interests as effectively as does the
'i40,Corps.. Given: that! the Corps is the' most appropriate
agency to' administer: the 'permit/public interest program, the
remainder'of the disoussioniwill·offer suggestions which,
could improve ·the present pzooeas , .
Define' the Public Interest-
Thus -far-,. this. study' has -revealed that the public
interest' is. a vague" ill: defined concepcc While agreement
concerning those factors which contribute to the pUblic in-
terest. may, exist, t.here is no consensus regarding the program IS
ultimate purpose •. Without a specific sense of purpose, the
program~s effectiveness is -diminished ..
At system which ,ranks· public interes-t factors could
alleviate many of the-problems-relating to the broad madate
and: decision, making proceas.. First, it provides the Corps
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with a baseline from which to initiate consistent decision
maki.ng. Second, it clarif:!.es the program's purpose enabling
the decision maker to become more responsive to the substan-
tive rather than procedural requirements.
Corps' regulations already specifically afford wet-
lanes protection high prioT;ity. A tanking sy~tem need not
unnecessarily reduce the flexibility needed in public interest
making. The ranking would still be based on current legis-
lation, court cases and executive orders. However, it would
reduce the potential for excessive politization. This policy
provided the Corps with guidelines in the Zabel v. Tabb, Marco
Island and Block PM" decisions. Such guidelines increase
the predictability of determinations which can prove advan-
tageous to developers and environmentalists alike. By extra-
polation, a system of relative values for important factors
of pubLao interest would strengthe.n the entire program.
Inplementation of State M.ajor Facility
Siting Programs
In most states, energy facility sites are chosen
according to private sector economic feasibility studies.
After the initial decision to locate has been made, the
applicant announces his plans and initiates the permit
process. If the proposal involves coastal alteration, then
the Corps is responsible for administering its public interest
review program and holds a pUblic hearing. At this point,
opposition to the proposal begins to coalesce and prepares
IC:4
for the upcoming battle. The result is a reactive as opposed
to planned at~osphere for decision making.
The implementation of state major facility sitting
programs could help alleviate many of the problems inherent
in reactive decision making. Certain states, such as Maryland
have already devised and implemented a program. The Maryland
Major Facility Siting Plan combines the requirements of two
of the State's existing programs; the Coastal Zone Management
Plan and the Power Plant Siting Act.
The plan includes a regional screening process which
examines pertinent data in a particular study region in order
to identify areas most likely to contain suitable sites for
the development of specific major facilities. The suggestions
are based on predetermined economic, engineering, sociological·
and environmental criteria. After candidate areas are located,
the program is equipped with a process for resolving major
facility generated conflicts and handbooks for use in asses-
sing fiscal, social and environmental effects of construction,
. d' t 141operat1on an ma1n enance.
Advance facility locational studies would be parti-
cularly advantageous to coastal states where conflicts be-
tween various uses are great. Not only would it ensure that
sites chosen best reflect the needs and policies of the state
but it would allow opposition to express concern over par-
ticular locations before the private sector has invested in
the site. This would enable the private sector to choose a
site, which. at best, has public support and, at worst, public
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indifference. Consequently, regulatory costs and delays
would be minimized while simultaneously serving the public
interest.
Furt.hermore, by designating regions which are optional
for major facility locations, state and local government
can plan for expected impacts and streamline permit proceedures
to accomodate future development.
Finally, major facility siting programs which include
state-local conflict resolution mechanisms, would aid the
Corps in making public interest determinations by resolving
state and local conflicts prior to the federal permit review.
The Corps would therefore be relieved of the difficult task
of overseeing the state's internal conflicts in addition to
its national interest pUblic mandate.
Virginia, which has no coastal zone management
plan or other broad Inanagement mechanism to resolve natural
resou~ce conflicts and stave off future disputes, would
benefit from a major facility siting program. Theoretically,
such a plan would have determined whether or not the area
was suitable for an oil refinery and resolved any public
disputes before HREC chose to locate. Consequently, if the
site was found to be suitable and conflict resolution was
successful, the Corps' public interest review would be
significantly simplified.
In summary, a major facility siting plan presents
a framework for decision making which saves time and money,
allows for the optimal siting of major facilities while min-
.....-
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imizing degradation of economically important natural
resources and serving the pUblic interest.
streamline Permit Procedures
The public interest review program's effectiveness
could be SUbstantially increased by reducing delay and in-
efficiency. All parties involved considered the requirements
governing the permit process needlessly time consuming and
dissent producing. However each differed in naming the cause
for complaint. Some accused the Corps of not exercising its
prerogative to render the decision expiditiously. Instead,
the Corps afforded the opportunity for all interested agencies
to participate in the process which resulted in significant
delays. But under the provisions of NEPA, FWCA and the MOU
with 001, the Corps is required to solicit .. comments from var-
ious agencies with different expertise. Furthermore, a full
review process provides the greatest assurance that the
pUblic is not only well informed but also that its interest
is best served.
Rather than reducing the Corps pUblic review process,
much delay could be avoided through better federal and state
coordination efforts. Since the Corps' mandate encompasses
the entire gamut of public interest factors, federal and
state agencies with permit jurisdiction should streamline
their review programs to not only avoid overlap but also to
expedite the review time frame. Specific suggestions for
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improvement would involve an in depth analysis of state and
other federal agency permit procedures and are therefore
beyond the scope of this study.
--------:=====--------~-======-~-_. __ ..._--
CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION
In the past, a broad consensus supported the Corps
in i-:.s pursuit of one narrow object.ive, the promotion of
navigation. Congress and the courts, however, have expanded
the Corps' jurisdiction to receive, one by one, proposals
for waterfront development; to evaluate the environmental,
economic and social ramifications of each, and then to
authorize, reject, or modify each proposal depending upon
whether it is in the public interest. Because of the all-
inclusiveness of the public interest review, execution by
the Corps of its statutory mandates, once fairly simple has
become extremely difficult. 142
Analysis of the Hampton Roads refinery proposal
reveals the difficulties inherent in the Corps' decision
making process whenever factors of public interest conflict.
In this case, the Corps had to balance several conflicting
factors of public interest, primarily the fish and wildlife
resources of the Chesapeake and the national need for energy
development. Relying upon extensive comments and reports
from federal and state agencies as well as citizen groups
and staff evaluations, the Corps balanced these factors within
the loose framework of the regulations.
10&
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The ultimate decision to grant the permits did not
dismiss the possibility of secondary and cummulative impacts
to natural resources ot the Chesapeake and the effects of
these impacts on the long term health of Bay dependent
econemies. The Corps, through its decision making process,
initiated compromises which, from its perspective, would allow
the coexistence of energy development and natural resources.
Weighed against a strong mandate to fulfill energy needs, the
Corps deemed the probabilities of impact were not sufficient
to warrant permit denial. "
Within the wide parameters of its mandate, the Corps
appears to have properly executed the public interest review•.
The Corps' decision therefore cannot be critici~ed as being
procedurally or legislatively incorrect. But a justifiable
determinatio~ does not necessarily translate into the best
decision. It does not preclude severe longterm natural
resource and economic impacts. Because the pUblic interest
regulations "'.re unable to enauze th(.! best decision, they
have been sUb~ect to criticism. In particular, the lack
of implementation guidelines, appears to provide a mechanism
through which complLlnce with procedural requirements takes
the place of substantive review. However, other factors
extranious tel the Corps' jurisdiction can have negative
impacts on the public interest review.
The public interest program could be improved by
better defining the purpose perhaps through the prioritization
lID
of factors. Additionally, early state planning could reduce
decision making problems. In the Hamp\on Roads example, a
state major facility siting plan could have avoided much of
the controversy and resolved the intense conflict of interests
which encompassed the project. This would result in an
environment much more conducive to responsibl~ decision
making at the federal level. Furthermore, state.and federal
initiatives to streamline permit procedures woUld allow the
Corps to expedite the public interest review and conduct
its own analysis of changes necessary to revise applicable
state and federal permitting structures are beyond the scope
of this study.
In conclusion, the broad public interest review is
a device that allows the Corps to weigh all relevant factors
in permit decisions. Although the review is subject to
,
both definitional and implementational problems, it is an
enormous step in the right direction. The Hampton Roads
refinery project provides an excellent example to examine
the adequacy with which the Corps implements its program
when factors of public interest direct~y conflict. This
analysis has shown that the Corps has procedurally adhered
to its regUlatory mandate. However, it is difficult to de-
termine whether or not the decision can be considered good
without a b~tter defined pUblic interest purpose. It should
be noted that implementation problems can be attributed more
to the broad mandate and permitting requirements outside the
III
Corps' juri.sdiction than to the Agency's execut.ion of the
program.
02/76 -
11/75 -
01/76
APPENDIX I
CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS
10/74 -.HRE.~C announces it will build the refinery on 600
acres in the West Norfolk section of ~ortsmouth.
3/75 - HREC files permit applicat:ion with Corps of Engineers
for dredging and construction.
09/75·- HREC files permit applications with state air and
water quality control boards.
10/75 - virginia Marine Resources commission issues state
dredge and fill permit.
State grants air pollution contrel permit. EPA
objects to permit as illegal in a nonattainrnent area.
Corps pUblishes draft ElS.
The SWPCB issues permit for compa.ny to build a pier
and marine terminal in Elizabeth ·Rive~.
CARE organizes and becomes a major force against
the refinery.
EPA publishes draft proposal for offset procedure,
designed to permit industrial expansion in a
nonattainment area.
05/76 - At public hearing on dredging permit, EPA states
refinery is environmentally unacceptable.
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05/76 to
09/76
ll~
,
HREC considers revision to the project plans, these
include: point source discharge into Elizabeth
River and, water intake supply from the city of
.Portsmouth.
06/76 - BREC applies for PSD in accordance with pre- 1977
Clean Air Act provisions.
09/76 - Environmental information requested from applicant
as a result of questions raised by the general public,
Federal and state agencies and Corps.
The DOl's Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) publicly
opposes the refinery.
02/77 - SWPCB approves wastewater discharge plan for refinery
but attaches a condition that the company must
devise a way to contain and clean up oil spills.
State submits incomplete offset proposal. EPA
requests data on projected ozone reduction.
04/77 - Environmental infor~ation received from applicants
consultant, NUS Corporation.
07/77 - EPA issues PSD permit, to expire January, 1979.
CARE and Virginia Oyster Packers and Planters
Association sue SWCB and HREC in an effort to block
the :!:"efinery.
10/77 - Final EIS released to public for review and conunent.
SAPCB extends construction permit (and extends
again in 1978) .
12/77 -
02/78 -
03/78 -
03/78 -
05/78 -
09/78 -
10/78 -
11/78 -
114
Corps' district engineer recommends denial of
dredging permit, applies to Governor for consent,
Governor objects and appears to favor the project.
Sta~e submits to EPA amended PSD permit proposal.
Division Engineer overrules District decision.
Depllrtments of Interior, Commerce and EPA challenge
decision. Matter is referred to Chief of Engineers.
Refinery proponents including Portsmou~h Mayor
Richard Davis, meet with White House officials
seeking support for the project.
Chief of the Corps Lt. General John Morris calls
for study to review alternatives to the Portsmouth
site. Initiates Interagency Task Force.
Corps issues supplemental EIS. Evaluation of
alternative East Coast sites rates Portsmouth second
worst of 19 sites i.n terms of environmental impact.
DOE representative dissents, calls it the best.
Refinery proponents meet second time with White
House officials.
Offset requirements finalized and published.
Chief of Enqineers' preliminary decision to issue
dredging permit with stipulation that Congress must
deauthorize the Federal anchorage in Elizabeth
River before construction. Letters to DOE and
other Federal agencies.
12/78 to
01/79 - 001 urges Army to deny permit. Army and Interior
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officials meet to resolve dispute over Portsmouth
refinery.
01/79 - 2nd District Rep. G. William Whitehurst urges Army
Secretary Clifford L. Alexander to deny dredging
permit.
02/S9 - HREC requests extension of PSD permit on grounds
that construction could not "commenceu within
approval ti.me peri.od since permit was conditioned
on EPA's approval of offset proposal embodied in
SIP revision, still pending.
4th District Rep. Robert W. Daniel Jr. introduces
legislation to de-authorize anchorage.
03/79 - Dredging p~rmit decision goes to Army Secretary
because of irresolvable disputes between the
Corps and DOl.
05/79 - EPA completes review of revised PSD proposal, finds
non-compliance with modeling requirements. Asks
for correction.
Eig~t federal agencies meet with Army officials
to discuss ~efinery·.
08/79 - Whitehurst urges Alexander to consider federal
reports saying that the country's existing refineries
need to expand before new ones are built.
10/79 - VAPCR extends HREC's state air emmissions permit
until occobex 1981.
116
Alexander announces that he will not approve the
dredging permit unless he receives overriding
"new elements of opposition".
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